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Abstract 
Safety-critical systems are typically assessed for their adherence to specified safety 
properties. They are studied down to the component-level to identify root causes of any 
hazardous failures. Most recent work with model-based safety analysis has focused on 
improving system modelling techniques and the algorithms used for automatic analyses 
of failure models. However, few developments have been made to improve the scope of 
reusable analysis elements within these techniques. The failure behaviour of 
components in these techniques is typically specified in such a way that limits the 
applicability of such specifications across applications. The thesis argues that allowing 
more general expressions of failure behaviour, identifiable patterns of failure behaviour 
for use within safety analyses could be specified and reused across systems and 
applications where the conditions that allow such reuse are present. 
This thesis presents a novel Generalised Failure Language (GFL) for the specification 
and use of component failure patterns. Current model-based safety analysis methods are 
investigated to examine the scope and the limits of achievable reuse within their 
analyses. One method, HiP-HOPS, is extended to demonstrate the application of GFL 
and the use of component failure patterns in the context of automated safety analysis. A 
managed approach to performing reuse is developed alongside the GFL to create a 
method for more concise and efficient safety analysis. The method is then applied to a 
simplified fuel supply and a vehicle braking system, as well as on a set of legacy models 
that have previously been analysed using classical HiP-HOPS. The proposed GFL 
method is finally compared against the classical HiP-HOPS, and in the light of this 
study the benefits and limitations of this approach are discussed in the conclusions. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Safety critical systems 
The modern world is increasingly filled with technology to provide tools and 
automation for a wide variety of tasks. This diversity ranges from small scale embedded 
devices to very large scale industrial sites. As people become more dependent on 
technology, the safety and reliability of systems becomes paramount. Reliability is the 
ability of a system to operate uninterrupted by failures, while the concept of system 
safety is the ability of a system to avoid causing hazards to people and the environment. 
The term safety critical system refers to those systems whose operation or failure causes 
such hazards (Leveson, 1995). 
The nature of many safety critical systems generally requires that some element of 
human interaction or control is in place, rather than complete automation of every 
function.  For the foreseeable future, some level of manual input will still be required 
for these kinds of systems as complete automation in many cases is simply not trusted. 
Certain legal requirements will apply to some extent with regards to safe operation for 
the protection of the people who interact with the system, but there is also the economic 
factor in the simple desire to have systems work reliably over the course of their 
operational life, with minimal „downtime‟ for any repair or modification which would 
otherwise affect productivity or provision of service. The increasing reliance on 
technology combined with the costs and potential risks of failure mean that safety and 
reliability become increasingly more important factors in system design. 
Safety critical systems are checked for their safety and reliability properties before they 
are deployed for operation. The process of safety analysis, the assessment of these 
criteria, begins during the design of the system and continues throughout the lifecycle. 
12 
 
A safety case (Wilson et al., 1997) for instance is incrementally built in step with the 
design and must be kept updated so far as the system is eventually decommissioned. 
Any changes to the system during its life will mean the safety case must be re-evaluated 
to assess the effects and implications of change, thus the safety analysis process is 
continual. Indeed, results of a safety assessment may necessitate further design changes 
if for example potential hazards are found.  
The aim of the safety analysis is to identify potential hazards associated with the 
operation or failure of a system and to explore the events that cause such hazards within 
the architecture of the system and in the environment. Hazardous states typically arise 
from system failures, i.e. conditions in which correct system function is not delivered 
(Avižienis et al., 2001). Failures can occur at the component level, the low-level 
constituent parts of a system, or at a system-wide level. Component level failures can 
propagate or combine with other, less severe failures to cause potentially hazardous 
system level failures.  
Thus the basis for predicting safety comes from identifying potential system failures, 
relating them to potential causes, and determining their likelihood from the likelihood of 
those causes. 
According to the standard terminology in this field of research, an error is the 
difference between the expected and actual system state that can lead to a failure, with 
the cause of an error ultimately being a fault (Avižienis et al., 2001). There are many 
types of faults, but generally a fault can arise from internal or external factors, for 
example a simple electronic component may malfunction over time due to wear, or from 
interference received from another source. Even the most rigorous design processes 
cannot always guarantee that a fault will not occur within a system, thus any system of 
any construction can experience failure at some point during its operational lifetime. 
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Faults can be random, being unexpected events brought about by a physical cause (e.g. 
wear or corrosion of components), but can be predicted using statistical data gathered 
from testing or prior knowledge from previous use. Alternatively faults can be 
systematic, a problem with the design or construction of the system (which could be 
introduced at any point in the lifecycle) meaning, once discovered, the fault occurs 
predictably during operation.  
Prediction of safety properties is now common and indeed mandatory for safety critical 
systems such as aircraft and nuclear power systems (Vesely et al., 1981). In the case of 
nuclear power systems for instance, electricity is generated from a highly radioactive 
source, direct exposure to which would be fatal to people. In the instance of a critical 
failure in the control system, lives are potentially put at risk and due to this potential 
hazard, safety features are incorporated into the system so that in the event of control 
failure, fail-safe and backup systems come online to prevent the escalation of the fault 
to a hazardous failure. Of course this adds complexity to the system, and these fail-safe 
features must themselves be checked for safety properties.  
In a well designed and constructed system, root causes of hazardous failures should 
have a very low probability of occurring during its operation. Component faults can be 
tolerated in certain circumstances when they do not contribute directly to hazards, 
otherwise they must have very low probability of occurrence or measures must be taken 
to stop the propagation of errors caused by such faults. Reliability statistics such as 
„mean-time-to-failure‟ are often provided by component manufacturers, so that system 
builders can be advised on when a component is expected to have reached the end of its 
safe operational lifespan. These figures can range from thousands of hours for the 
mechanical components in a typical domestic car, to only a few hours in a motorsport 
racing car where components operate in extreme conditions. This type of data is 
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essential when analysing a system for failures; when a potential hazard is found, the 
root causes are checked for their probability of occurrence. Knowing the likelihood of 
occurrence will influence decisions about the cost-effectiveness of implementing 
improved safety features for avoiding hazards. Sufficiently unlikely hazards do not 
demand design iterations while likely hazards with severe consequences necessitate 
redesign, the aim of which should be either to remove the hazard if possible, or to 
decrease the likelihood of the hazard for example via incorporation of fault tolerant 
architecture that can prevent the direct propagation of the component faults that cause 
the hazard.   
To improve efficiency and cost, modern systems rely increasingly on electronics and 
computers (Ferguson, 2007). This can result in new types of failure occurring, which 
can compromise safety and complicate safety analysis. For example, a hydraulic control 
for a vehicle braking system can only ever allow braking pressure to be applied to 
wheels when pressure is applied to the brake pedal. If the hydraulic system were 
replaced with an electronic control, braking control signals would be sent to actuators to 
apply the braking pressure. Now this new system is potentially susceptible to erroneous 
control signals, possibly caused by interference to the electronics, leading to undesired 
application of the brakes. Conversely, undesired application of braking pressure is 
impossible with a hydraulic system. 
To summarise, there exists a class of systems that are considered safety critical, whose 
requirements for operational safety must be checked before they can be used by people. 
No system is free from faults, so they are analysed for potential hazardous failures 
which could arise from the occurrence of specific faults, or combinations of faults. 
Quantitative data is used to supplement this analysis to determine the likelihood of 
failures. Finally, design changes can be made in response to analysis results in order to 
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eliminate or mitigate the effects of a hazardous failure. This complete process is known 
as safety analysis. 
1.2 Safety Analysis 
Modern safety analysis has been heavily influenced by the nuclear power industry 
which is forced to deal with a high level of complexity and stringent legal requirements 
of operational safety. However, the challenge of identifying hazards remains, as does 
the consequence of making design changes to reduce the risk and the severity of the 
hazardous states. 
Many techniques for safety analysis have been developed, the earliest being tabular 
methods of compiling information about potential failures such as Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) (IEC 60812, 2006) and Hazard and Operability Studies 
(HAZOP) (Kletz, 1997). These are generally now supplemented by powerful graphical 
methods such as Fault Tree and Event Tree Analysis (FTA, ETA) (IEC 61025, 1990) 
which are founded on logic and probabilistic analyses. For example a fault tree diagram 
is a graphical means to display the root causes and propagation of failures, showing how 
basic events can combine and propagate to cause a hazard (Vesely et al., 1981). The 
success of these methods has meant they are now widely used outside of the nuclear 
industry, such as in the automotive (Papadopoulos and Grante, 2005) and aerospace 
(Vesely et al., 2002) industries. 
Safety analysis is a field that has seen a lot of research and development since its 
conception, but the core aspects have not changed considerably over time. A common 
approach, used for example in fault tree analysis, begins with the identification of 
potential system failures that have a hazardous consequence. A specific failure will be 
chosen for detailed investigation and is traced back through the system to its root 
causes, which will typically be component level faults; this is known as a deductive 
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approach. Some other techniques work in the opposite way, an inductive approach, 
where effects are determined from causes. For example, FMEA begins with tabulating 
the potential failures that can be experienced and then examines their effects on the 
system. 
Safety analysis is traditionally a manual, arduous task. Analyses are performed by a 
team of specialist analysts on a system implementation. If safety and reliability aspects 
are deemed inadequate, then costly redesigns may be essential. Furthermore, subject to 
the effect on the system of such a change, analyses may then need to be performed 
again. A complex system design can make the process even more difficult, and as a 
result several software tools have been developed to help with analyses. The common 
aim with these is to automate as much of the process as possible, which is often the 
focus in the development of contemporary safety analysis methods. 
In theory, the safety analysis process should start as early as possible so that checking 
the system for potential failures occurs at early design stages. This way, problems can 
be identified earlier in the development lifecycle, meaning unnecessary redesign cost 
could be reduced. The difficulty is that without the complete knowledge of component 
interactions at each stage when analysis is applied, this approach is not possible. In 
order to analyse for safety at design stages, a model of the complete system is required. 
With appropriate software tools, models can be mechanically interpreted, enabling a 
form of model-based safety analysis (MBSA). 
The model that provides the basis of analysis may be architectural and provide the 
topology of the system as a diagram showing the interconnected components, each 
assigned information about their function and failure behaviour. It can also be a 
representation of behaviour and show transitions of components and the system from 
normal to degraded and failed states.  
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An example of a model-based analysis technique is HiP-HOPS (Hierarchically 
Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies), a method and tool that performs a 
semi-automatic safety analysis on system designs (Papadopoulos et al., 2001) that are 
represented as architectural topologies augmented with failure data. Using a model-
based approach, components in the system hierarchy can be annotated with logical 
expressions of failure behaviour. In HiP-HOPS, these component-level annotations are 
interpreted by the tool and in combination with the topology of the system, used to 
automatically synthesise fault trees and FMEAs for the model. 
1.2.1 Reuse in designs and safety analysis 
Managing complexity in engineering projects is a problem in itself, especially as more 
functionality is demanded from contemporary systems. To ease development, there is a 
tendency to reuse solutions that have been successful in one project to aid the 
development of another. This can take the form of reusing particular hardware 
components or subsystems, or even software where there is a computer-controlled 
element. This has varying degrees of success due to reuse being susceptible to 
inappropriate application. For instance, a problem could be identified by an engineer as 
being „similar enough‟ to one seen in a previous system that a prior solution is deemed 
adequate. In this situation, the ad hoc „cut & paste‟ approach to reuse may lead to an 
unsatisfactory implementation, with costly consequences. A more appropriate method is 
to control and manage reuse through a systematic process (Kelly and McDermid, 1998). 
Being able to appropriately reuse a solution means the design process can be completed 
more quickly, bringing time and cost saving benefits. In addition, by applying well-
known solutions to problems, the result is a design which can be considered more 
„trusted‟, which is a very desirable factor when developing safety critical systems. 
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In the pursuit of reusing as much design knowledge as possible, there are established 
concepts to manage the various levels and type of reuse. The most common forms of 
reusable design elements are components, frameworks and patterns (Johnson, 1997). 
Each of these provides a certain level of abstraction, allowing reuse across various 
applications. Components are self-contained „blocks‟ of well-known design, 
frameworks provide a reusable basis to build upon, and patterns define generic 
behaviour which can be adapted to context. Each of these is used within the field of 
engineering and can be very useful concepts to aid and speed up design and 
development of new systems. The concept of patterns can be found for example within 
software engineering as design patterns (Gamma et al., 1995), and is established as a 
technique that can enable robust, consistent design of common software solutions. They 
promote good engineering practice and a certain degree of reusability, for example in 
class design and interaction. Design patterns take the form of documentation showing 
an implementation of the solution, plus additional information listed for guiding its 
application; the documentation as a whole becomes the „pattern‟. In another context, the 
notion of patterns can be used to guide the construction of arguments in a safety case 
(Kelly and McDermid, 1997), in this case the pattern provides an abstract, reusable 
guide to building the arguments, with flow diagrams and explanatory text, together 
constituting the „pattern‟. Not all aspects of a design can be reused of course, nor would 
such blanket reuse be desirable, for many systems require bespoke components. 
However, attempting to further extend the scope and ease of reusability is a worthwhile 
cause, as it undoubtedly yields an improvement in productivity (Kehren et al., 2004). 
Knowing that reuse is an important feature of modern system design, including safety 
critical design, leads to the question: can reusable design elements, particularly patterns, 
be brought into safety analysis methods, allowing some degree of reuse of information 
about safety properties? 
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Contemporary MBSA methods, for example HiP-HOPS and other methods examined in 
this thesis, do enable some reuse of safety analyses. These tend to base their reuse on 
the compositional nature of the systems they analyse. Systems in general are developed 
via decomposition into more manageable parts, and can be represented in design as 
hierarchies of subsystems and basic components. Reflecting this compositional 
architecture, many modern safety analysis methods rely on component failure models to 
predict system failure. These component models can in theory be reused across 
applications in the analyses of systems that incorporate the corresponding components. 
While such reusability is highly desirable, the expected level of reuse that compositional 
analyses should bring is currently very difficult to achieve. The limiting factor is that 
this kind of reuse depends on the fact that the reused components have not been 
modified in any way which affects their operation and thus their safety properties. 
However, even for simple components this may not be possible due to context changes; 
information about specific failures may become irrelevant within a new application. An 
example of this can be seen in an automotive brake-by-wire system. Here, the 
components have a specific application context; communication buses for example 
carry signals that relate to activation of the brakes or the amount of pressure to be 
applied. In most MBSA approaches, the component models that define the failure 
behaviour of a component like a bus in a given application make application-specific 
references to the errors propagated through the bus, in this example, deviations of 
braking messages. This is despite the fact that a bus component can be designed to 
propagate signals without needing to know the meaning or context. In summary, while a 
communication bus can work in various application contexts, information about its 
failure behaviour maintains its context specificity and cannot necessarily be reused 
along with the physical component. Thus one of the major obstacles to achieving 
greater reusability within compositional model-based safety analyses is this context-
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specific nature; in particular the context-specific definitions of component failure 
behaviour. 
There are cases where a component will behave consistently and independently of its 
system context, giving an opportunity to investigate context-independent failure 
behaviour. In a rudimentary example of this, a pipe enables the flow of material without 
needing to know what is flowing. A total blockage of the pipe will always result in a 
loss of output flow, again regardless of the material. With regards to electronic 
components, they too can exhibit this type of context-independent behaviour. An 
electronic data bus designed to propagate signals can experience the same type of 
failure, omission of output signals, regardless of the system and meaning of the signals. 
There are many more cases where context-independent behaviour is expressed by 
individual components. When such context-independent behaviour exists, it can be 
identified as a reusable element, a pattern of behaviour that holds in any application. If 
capture and reuse of such patterns were possible, then the safety analysis of complex 
systems could also benefit from reusing well-established and thoroughly studied 
component failure behaviour. Not only would this save time, money and effort, but it 
would potentially improve the dependability of designs by incorporating aspects which 
are proven to be effective and are essentially „trusted‟ elements. The difficulty however 
in capturing such patterns lies in the current inability to define generalised failure 
behaviour in most techniques that define the state-of-the-art in model-based safety 
analysis. 
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1.3 Research hypothesis and Objectives 
The hypothesis put forward and tested in this thesis is that: 
 “More efficient safety analyses can be achieved via a new approach to 
generalising descriptions of failure behaviour. This approach will allow in 
practice the more concise specification and limited reuse of patterns of 
failure behaviour” 
The above hypothesis raises two research questions that the thesis attempts to address: 
1. How can descriptions of failure behaviour be generalised?  
2. To what extent can patterns of behaviour be used within safety analysis? 
Testing the hypothesis requires meeting several objectives. The first of these is to 
examine relevant MBSA techniques to evaluate the current extent of achievable reuse. 
There are several MBSA methods which aim to promote reuse in safety analysis and 
which, therefore, need to be examined in order to inform the objectives and direction of 
this work.  
The second objective is to develop a concept for generalised annotation and demonstrate 
that the proposed concept works by extending an existing safety analysis method to 
enable specification and reuse of patterns. The candidate method for this extension, 
HiP-HOPS, is an established tool and already provides some support for reuse. Systems 
can be hierarchically decomposed within HiP-HOPS to allow component level 
descriptions of failure, but the annotations themselves are generally restricted to the 
particular context of the system. This immediately limits the scope of reusability of 
failure annotations within HiP-HOPS. Here the aim is to achieve an extension of the 
existing component annotation syntax with language features that enable specific 
context to be eliminated from annotations. The result is an annotation language that 
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enables more generalised descriptions of component failure behaviour (Wolforth et al., 
2010a). 
The final objective in this thesis is to validate the proposed method. Case studies 
provide an opportunity to show how the method is applied, and to evaluate the 
contribution brought by the new approach. In the study included in this thesis, several 
example models are analysed to compare the extended HiP-HOPS method that includes 
capabilities for patterns with the classical HiP-HOPS. These are relatively simple 
models based on prototype systems provided by industry, comprising various types of 
components; mechanical, electrical and programmable. In the course of these case 
studies, equivalent specifications are developed in classical and extended HiP-HOPS 
and the results are compared.  The use of patterns is demonstrated to lead to shorter 
specifications that can be reused within the same application.  
To quantify the effectiveness of the new approach, data mining techniques are used to 
identify patterns of failure behaviour in legacy safety analyses that have been carried 
out using classical HiP-HOPS in a number of industrial case studies. It is shown that the 
number of component level annotations can be significantly reduced via the proposed 
extensions to HiP-HOPS, and that it is possible to capture patterns of behaviour which 
can then be reused within the same model. This data forms the basis of the evaluation of 
the pattern method; the amount of reuse that can be expected and the effectiveness of 
the reuse. 
To summarise, this thesis makes the case for the development and application of 
patterns of failure behaviour in model-based safety analysis. The improvement to the 
efficiency of analyses is investigated, as is the overall effectiveness of the approach. To 
support the argument put forward, the thesis: 
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1. Develops a language extension for HiP-HOPS to enable patterns of behaviour to 
be specified 
2. Implements tool support that enables analyses of component failure patterns and 
derivation of specific instances of failure behaviour from such patterns 
3. Develops a managed approach for the application of patterns and investigates 
the potential for reuse 
4. Evaluates the feasibility of patterns on a series of case studies 
5. Compares and contrasts the new method with the classical HiP-HOPS process 
1.3.1 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of three main chapters describing the background, theory, and 
validation of the concept being argued. Chapter 2 presents a review of available 
literature on classical and contemporary safety analysis techniques, with an evaluation 
of reuse attainable in safety analysis and more generally in the wider field of 
engineering. Chapter 3 sets out the concept for patterns and proposes the linguistic 
constructs necessary for enabling generalised failure descriptions. Chapter 4 discusses 
the application of patterns and how they can be managed to enable greater levels and 
more appropriate reuse. A series of case studies are performed, the results of which are 
used for validating the new technique. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis, evaluating the 
contributions of the work along with the limitations, and finally discusses further work. 
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2 Background 
This chapter reviews available, relevant literature in the field of safety analysis to 
provide a more detailed view of the research problem. The first part explores the 
methods used in safety analysis; the original, classical techniques which are still in use 
today, through to the contemporary methods developed to deal with the more complex 
designs which are typical among modern systems. The techniques are discussed and 
evaluated, with the emphasis on their benefits and shortcomings with respect to the 
reusability within their processes, such as the scope, ease and potential for reuse. The 
focus here is on the qualitative aspects of safety analysis; studies of probability are 
essential in rigorous analyses, but this work only considers extension to the core 
qualitative process which is primarily concerned with identification and establishment 
of relationships between causes and effects of failures. 
The second part of this chapter discusses the concept and scope of reusability in general, 
as found in the wider field of engineering, with a focus on those techniques applied in 
software development. The aim is to highlight which aspects can or could be transferred 
into and applied within safety analysis. In conclusion, this study of available literature 
highlights the important aspects to consider in developing a contemporary approach to 
reuse in safety analysis. 
2.1 Classical Safety Analysis 
There are many approaches and techniques used for safety analysis, varying from 
relatively simple data tabulation, through to highly complex, computerised simulations 
of functional prototypes. This is largely in response to the variation of system designs; 
the variety of complex systems in today‟s industries means one specific analysis 
technique is simply not sufficient (Kaiser et al., 2003). As a result, new techniques are 
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developed to meet the demands of contemporary system designs, and it is notable that a 
significant amount of these tend to be variations of a small number of classical analysis 
methods (Gould et al., 2000). 
It is often the case that the basic principles of the classical methods are still valid in 
modern approaches, but some limitations inherent in the original methods also still hold 
in the newer ones. It is important to discuss these original methods so to observe the 
evolution of the more recent techniques by highlighting the successful features from the 
classical methods that have been carried over into contemporary approaches.  
2.1.1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) (IEC 60812, 2006) is a widely used, tabular 
process for checking the safety and reliability properties of a system. FMEA and its 
variants are used across a large range of industries, and this level of adoption has 
occurred despite the difficulties encountered when using this classical method. 
An FMEA is typically a manual, labour intensive process for finding the effects of 
component failures on a system. For each component in the system and for each failure 
mode of that component, analysts investigate the effects on the system and record 
results in an FMEA table. The linear, tabulated form of the information gives a 
straightforward representation, making it simple for manual inspection of results and 
identification of critical component failure modes that cause severe effects with high 
probability. Variants of FMEA tables contain different attributes including contributing 
factors, failure probability or failure rate, detectability, controllability and other 
parameters of interest. For example Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) (ARP 926, 1967) is a commonly used extension of FMEA which includes the 
criticality of failures in the assessment, for analysing their probability and severity.  
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Table 1 gives an example of a row in an FMEA of a vehicle braking system. Here the 
brake pedal can experience the failure mode „No signal‟, leading to the effect „Omission 
of braking‟. The detail of the cause and its failure rate (probability per unit time) are 
given along with the severity, giving clear information so that the analyst‟s attention can 
be focused towards those failure modes deemed most critical. Because the FMEA 
process requires a lot of detail about a system before it can be performed, it is mainly 
done when all details of the design are known. 
Component Failure 
mode 
Failure cause Failure effect Severity Failure 
rate 
Pedal No signal Pedal failure Omission of 
braking 
Catastrophic 5e
-5 
... ... ... ... ... ... 
Table 1 Example FMEA table 
Like other classical methods, traditional FMEA suffers from scalability problems. The 
first of which is that an FMEA table only describes failures that have a single cause. 
Multiple-cause failures, which are not uncommon in today‟s complex systems, are not 
considered in the analysis process. The reason for this, and the root of the second 
problem, is that the consideration of every possible combination of component failure 
modes can lead to extremely large tables. Even relatively simple systems with a large 
number of failure modes can suffer this problem during the analysis, e.g. in a system 
with 100 component failure modes, there are approximately 5,000 combinations of two 
of those failure modes to be considered. Clearly, the manual interpretation of such large 
volumes of data, often ranging into hundreds of thousands of combinations of failures, 
is not feasible within the time or budget allowed for such analyses.  
The traditional FMEA process is capable of finding multiple-cause failures, but they are 
generally not considered within a study because they are too numerous. Being a manual 
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process, the effort required for a complete multiple-cause FMEA in most cases is too 
great. However, recent developments to FMEA production (Parker et al., 2006) have 
enabled automation and improved tool support which have made feasible the discovery 
of multiple-cause failures. In this approach, multiple failure mode FMEAs are 
constructed from a set of automatically constructed fault trees. Given the deductive 
nature of fault tree analysis, is it possible in this approach to generate multiple failure 
mode FMEAs without exhaustive enumeration and evaluation of all possible 
combinations of component failure modes.  Price and Taylor (2002) have also 
developed an approach to FMEA synthesis via fault simulation in which results of 
automated FMEAs may be „pruned‟ to extract combinations which are deemed 
significant.  
Potentially, some data from an FMEA can be reused, though effects must be carefully 
checked. If an FMEA only contains simple failure modes, it may be the case that a 
particular component would exhibit the same standard behaviour regardless of context, 
and if operating conditions are identical, also likely to maintain the same failure rate. 
The obstacle to achieving more reuse is the informal, manual nature of the analysis; 
descriptions of failures (the entries within a table) are subject to the engineer‟s 
consistency with the formatting. Without a systematic approach to developing 
consistent FMEA tables, efforts to reuse information across analyses have limited 
success. 
2.1.2 Hazard and operability studies 
Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) (Kletz, 1997) was one of the earliest methods 
created for checking system safety and is still widely used, especially in the chemical 
industry. It aims to be a generic technique to find causes and effects of hazards, 
meaning it is both a deductive and inductive method. These are specified as deviations 
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from the original design intent; for example the flow of material through pipes can 
deviate from its normal operation as a result of „no flow‟ (a blockage), which could 
ultimately lead to a hazardous state.  This method been adopted throughout safety-
critical industries with very little change to the original method, due to its generalised 
format and overall relative ease of use. 
A HAZOP study is performed by manually searching for hazards in a systematic way 
and tabulating the results. The basis is to use identifying keywords to describe potential 
hazards and then to derive their potential causes. This keyword concept was an attempt 
to allow some form of reuse within safety checking. Giving classifications to failures, a 
common keyword, allows the analyst to make general statements about failure types. 
For example, the following keywords are valid in a HAZOP study and are typical of the 
types of failures considered within other types of safety analysis: 
OMISSION or COMMISSION: e.g. the absence or presence of an expected message 
HIGH or LOW: e.g. an out-of-range signal 
EARLY or LATE: e.g. a message has arrived before or after it was expected 
The result of a HAZOP study is a table bringing together all the gathered information on 
the system relating hazardous failures to their cause(s). Table 2 gives a partial HAZOP 
table; the example shown is of a generic system where a signal node fails to deliver an 
output, leading to a system wide failure. The resolution to this hazard is to replicate the 
critical node to provide some backup redundancy in event of node failure. 
HAZOP was created and is useful for identifying specific failures which can occur in 
large scale industrial sites. For modern computer controlled systems, it is very difficult 
to manage a HAZOP study with the high numbers of potential component failures. The 
tabular format of the results can make it simple to quickly identify the causes of 
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hazards, but with a large table it becomes less practical, for instance trying to find the 
information for a particular hazard among hundreds of table entries.  Furthermore, 
classical HAZOP studies only determine single-cause hazards, making it unsuitable for 
thorough analyses that must consider all possible hazards. 
Keyword Deviation Cause(s) Consequence(s) Resolution 
OMISSION No signal Node failure System failure Replicated 
node 
... ... ... ... ... 
Table 2 Example HAZOP table 
 Hazard analyses are performed throughout the life of a system (Redmill et al., 1997). 
Early studies can take place when design detail of components and interconnections is 
available. A preliminary hazard analysis (Vesely et al., 1981) can provide useful 
information that can be carried over to more detailed analyses that take place at later 
stages when more detailed designs are available. HAZOP studies then continue 
throughout the lifecycle of a safety critical system, as it is necessary to reassess 
potential hazards whenever operating parameters or conditions change. Thus any scope 
for employing reusable elements across HAZOP studies would be beneficial.Smith and 
Harrison (2002) have investigated techniques to enable reuse of descriptive arguments 
for hazard classification. A row in a HAZOP table can form an argument based on the 
consequence and resolution columns; the basis for the reuse lies in the similarity in 
argument structure. Reuse candidates are identified by matching keywords or 
consequences from previously defined arguments. Case studies have shown a 
„considerable amount‟ of achievable reuse, but a difficulty still remains in determining 
the suitability of arguments for a particular context. 
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2.1.3 Fault Tree Analysis 
The problems encountered in classical FMEA motivated the development of fault tree 
analysis (FTA) (Vesely et al., 1981), currently one of the most prominent safety 
analysis techniques. FTA was first developed in 1961 by Bell Laboratories, in 
connection with a U.S. Air Force contract, to investigate the potential causes of an 
inadvertent missile launch. Once the results were seen, fault tree analysis was 
recognised by Boeing as being a significant system safety analysis tool, eventually 
being used on the design and evaluation of commercial aircraft. Following the 
aerospace industry, the nuclear power industry began using fault tree analysis in the 
design of nuclear power stations. It was the nuclear power industry which is responsible 
for the development of many fault tree analysis tools. In 1967, NASA hired Boeing to 
undertake a comprehensive fault tree analysis on the entire Apollo system, following the 
Apollo 1 launch pad fire. The Challenger space shuttle disaster in 1986 resulted in a 
safety evaluation of the main engines, which highlighted the applied benefits of fault 
tree analysis. Today, fault tree analysis is widely recognised as a robust and useful 
process which helps to develop insight into the failure behaviour of a system. 
A fault tree diagram represents the propagation of failures through a hardware or 
software system in terms of subsystem or component failures. These „basic events‟ are 
linked into a tree structure using Boolean logic, representing diagrammatically the 
logical relation between events. The paths through the fault tree from bottom to top 
determine which of these combinations of basic events cause the top event. The Fault 
Tree Handbook (Vesely et al., 1981) is widely accepted as the definition of the 
standards for fault tree notation and method. An example fault tree is given in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 A small fault tree (Andrews, 1998) 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a technique that can be applied to a fault tree to determine: 
 all the necessary and sufficient combinations of basic events that cause the top 
event of  the fault tree (qualitative analysis) 
 the probability of occurrence of these combinations and that of the top event 
(quantitative analysis) 
Combinations of basic events that cause the top event (i.e. system failure) are known as 
cut sets. By identifying critical design elements, cut sets help to focus the design. For 
example, the design can then be improved by incorporating redundant components that 
can automatically replace critical components when they fail. 
32 
 
An interesting and useful property of a fault tree is that it is essentially a graphical 
representation of a complex Boolean expression, meaning the whole or sub-trees can be 
expressed textually, which also extends to the cut sets. A cut set can be considered then 
as a written expression relating a failure to its causes; from the Figure 1 example: 
Protection Fail = Smoke Fail AND Heat Fail OR Pump Fail OR Nozzle Fail 
Much of the recent innovation into the fault tree method has come from the analysis 
side; various algorithms for the automatic extraction of minimal cut sets exist 
(Wolforth, 2005), and research continues into finding faster and more efficient methods. 
In addition, fault tree notation is being continually improved and extended so that more 
detailed representation can be made within a diagram, allowing fault trees to remain a 
powerful tool today. For instance, traditional fault trees cannot accurately model 
dynamic behaviour, where the order of events is critical, so many attempts have been 
made to extend the notation for creating temporal fault trees (Walker, 2009). 
Because fault trees only give a system-wide view of failure, one difficulty with using 
the method is that any redesign made to a system, even small changes, may require that 
the entire fault tree is reconstructed and reanalysed. Also cut sets describe very specific 
events within a particular system, so reuse of cut sets i.e. analysis results is not feasible 
across designs. 
Dehlinger and Lutz have shown that reuse of fault trees within a „family‟ of systems is 
possible. A product line (or family) is a set of systems that are all developed from a core 
specification, where members of the product line differ only in a small number of 
allowed variables. The reuse benefits from an engineering perspective (shared design 
elements, architecture, etc. within the family) can also be related to safety analysis 
through modelling extensions to classical fault tree analysis (Lutz et al., 1998). In 
product line fault tree analysis (PLFTA), design variables are associated with the tree‟s 
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leaf nodes. An analysis can then derive a fault tree for each product as the variables 
change. A semi-automated tool „PLFaultCAT‟ has been developed for PLFTA, however 
the manual effort of the analysts and engineers, as with classical FTA, is still the main 
factor in the accuracy and completeness of analyses and therefore the extent of 
reusability (Dehlinger and Lutz, 2006). 
2.1.4 The Safety Case 
A higher level approach for arguing convincingly that a system will safely perform its 
operations is the concept of the safety case (Wilson et al., 1997). The purpose is to give 
a documented assurance that system safety requirements are met. Indeed the safety case 
is a legal requirement in many regulated industries in order to provide such assurances 
to a regulating body. The safety case report which argues the case is a set of complex 
documents, manually constructed by a team of analysts, which summaries results of 
safety assessments. 
The exact constituents of a safety case document vary with application and are not 
subject to a common specification (Wilson et al., 1997), but a safety case must at least 
include clear, well-defined arguments, supported by evidence, that a system will be 
acceptably safe throughout its life (Wilson et al., 1995). These are the key elements of 
the safety case; an argument without supporting evidence is unconvincing, and evidence 
without an argument makes it difficult to distinguish how safety requirements have been 
met. Below is an example of a safety argument from (Kelly and Weaver, 2004): 
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The Defence in Depth principle (P65) has been addressed in this system through 
the provision of the following:  
•     Multiple physical barriers between hazard source and the environment (see 
Section X)  
•     A protection system to prevent breach of these barriers and to mitigate the 
effects of a barrier being breached (see Section Y)  
The evidence for an argument may be for example fault trees or FMEAs for the system. 
Because safety case evidence is often based on the results of prior safety analyses 
(Wilson et al., 1997), a safety case is not itself a means to discover failure behaviour, 
rather it is a useful means to present safety information in a structured manner.  
Developing the safety case is no easy task, the most pertinent difficulty being their 
potential size, in terms of their construction, management and subsequent analysis, 
particularly for large studies. This can lead to difficulties in maintaining a complete 
document, necessitating a significant manual effort. Addressing these problems, recent 
improvements to the construction and management of safety cases have been made in 
the form of software tool support with the Safety Argument Manager (SAM) 
(McDermid, 1994) and the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) (Kelly, 1998). SAM is a 
tool for performing various classical safety analyses, which provide the results 
(evidence) for use in the subsequent safety case development. The GSN, as part of 
SAM, is used to help set out the claims of the arguments, aiding the most difficult part 
of developing the safety case. Following the goals gives a progression through the 
argument, typically formed as a hierarchy of lower level arguments. 
Because of the complexity involved in their production, individuals responsible for 
creating the document will often take elements of previous safety cases to help their 
development (Kelly and McDermid, 1997). The danger is that successful, convincing 
arguments are taken as „trusted‟ and can be reused without thorough investigation of the 
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applicability (Kelly and McDermid, 1998). This kind of reuse is based on the manual 
observation that two elements are similar enough to be used in another design, with few 
changes needed. Clearly when this is handled manually by people, errors and 
inconsistencies can easily be introduced through improper reuse. Despite the 
difficulties, skilled safety engineers can successfully produce rigorous safety cases to 
give the evidence that even a complex system is safe to operate.  
2.2 Contemporary Safety Analysis 
Modern systems bring new challenges to safety analysis. These are caused by the large 
scale (many components, e.g. small sensors and micro switches) and increasing 
complexity (e.g. programmable/software components introducing new types of failures) 
of these systems. 
Clearly the manual nature of classical techniques poses problems. It makes it 
increasingly difficult to achieve a complete analysis within the time and budget 
constraints of most projects. The lack of mechanisms for safe reuse of analyses is 
another problem. For example, subsystems and components may be reused to perform 
the same or similar function across applications. However, with the lack of a proper 
framework for reuse, it cannot be assumed that their respective safety analysis can be 
safely reused across applications. Part of the problem is the separation of classical safety 
analysis from the design process, which makes it difficult to trace the effects of design 
modifications in the analysis. 
This section reviews several modern safety analysis techniques that attempt to address 
some of these problems. Most of these techniques integrate design with analysis and 
derive system safety analyses from a model of the system. Some of these techniques 
follow a compositional approach in which system safety analyses are constructed from 
component safety analyses via a process of composition. This enables a greater scope 
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for reuse of analysis elements within their methods. Many of these techniques have their 
foundations in the classical methods, often making improvements over the original and 
solving some of their drawbacks highlighted in the previous discussion. 
2.2.2 Model-Based Safety Analysis 
Many contemporary approaches use a model of a system and its behaviour to improve 
and automate (to a degree) some aspects of the safety analysis. Generally, a model is a 
representation of a system describing architecture and/or functional behaviour. 
Interconnected components in an architectural model also determine the flow of failures 
through a system, which some methods exploit to create a corresponding failure logic 
model (Lisagor et al., 2006).  
 Many tools exist to help develop models; some rely on text-based descriptions whereas 
others allow a model to be developed visually, for example in MATLAB/Simulink 
(Mathworks, 2009). When a system is under design, a model can be produced with 
varying levels of detail. For example early design may only yield a relatively simple 
model consisting of blocks of interconnected components. As more detail is provided, 
for example when functions are allocated to components, more detailed models can be 
produced. Models can be updated throughout the lifecycle to reflect function or 
architecture changes in the system. The implication for safety analyses is that effects of 
design changes can be more quickly assessed. As models are defined using formal and 
semi-formal languages and notations, they can be mechanically interpreted (parsed) and 
therefore used as the basis for automated analysis. This type of automation, while being 
able to speed up the overall process, has the potential to reduce the opportunity for 
manual errors in the analysis. This is a major benefit and one of the main motivations 
for new model-based analysis methods which provide as much automation as possible. 
It is important to note however that none of the contemporary methods reviewed in this 
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chapter provide fully automated analyses; some manual effort is still required, mainly at 
early stages of their process where the modelling must be done. 
2.2.3 FPTN 
Failure Propagation and Transformation Notation (FPTN) (Fenelon and McDermid, 
1993) was developed to allow a compositional approach to safety analysis and has 
influenced the development of subsequent methods. The motivation for its development 
was to solve some of the problems of the classical methods while also creating a more 
integrated approach to safety analysis (Fenelon et al., 1994). FPTN was primarily 
developed to aid fault tree analysis and FMECA when applied to software, but can be 
applied to any system with a compositional architecture. A component failure can be 
traced through the system to determine its effects (inductively) to create an FMECA. 
Alternatively an output failure can be traced to its root causes (deductively) to create a 
fault tree for analysis. The method aims to give a generalised view of system failure 
behaviour and provide a link between such deductive and inductive analyses. 
An FPTN module directly represents an architectural component in a model. A 
complete diagram will show how failures flow through the system through the 
interconnected components (modules), thus creating the failure model. Each module 
may then contain a number of sub-modules to create a component hierarchy (Grunske 
and Neumann, 2002). The result is that both deductive and inductive analyses can be 
performed with an FPTN diagram, as failure modes can be traced backwards to discover 
causes, or forwards to discover effects. 
Each module contains the name of the component, a criticality level and where 
applicable, any recovery mechanisms („exception handlers‟). These are included within 
the header of a module, as shown in the example module in Figure 2. Each module also 
contains the failure modes of the component (internal failures), expressions relating 
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input and output failure modes, and may be modelled such that modules are nested 
hierarchically. SHARD-style classifiers (Ezhilchelvan  and  Shrivastava, 1989) are used 
for definition of failure types, i.e. timing (t), value (v), etc. 
Figure 2 Example FPTN module (Fenelon et al., 1993)  
It is possible to reproduce the failure expressions contained in a module in a simplified 
„sum-of-products‟ form, which are equivalent to the minimal cut sets generated in FTA, 
where the output failure mode is considered as the top event. This means that an 
individual FPTN module can be considered an abstraction of the set of fault trees for the 
component represented by the module. 
The main benefit of FPTN is the end-to-end modelling, linking deductive (e.g. FTA) 
and inductive (e.g. FMECA) approaches. As the modelling reflects the system 
architecture, faults can be seen to propagate through components, arguably making root 
cause identification easier. The drawbacks of FPTN though, are that it is strictly a 
descriptive notation and cannot be used to analyse failure propagation (Wallace, 2005), 
and has struggled to receive tool support (Paige et al., 2009). Also an FPTN module 
represents only known failure propagation between components, so connections 
between modules are not made unless a known failure propagates between architectural 
components. Finally, with regards to reusability, a key problem with the FPTN method 
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is that the detail of the modules is context specific; they need to be reconstructed 
whenever a change takes place in a component, because a change may alter the type of 
failure propagated and also to where the failure is propagated. This limits their 
reusability despite the compositionality of the diagram, but recent improvements to the 
notation (discussed in the following section) have allowed more generalisation and 
improved reusability. 
2.2.4 FPTC 
Influenced by FPTN, FPTC (Fault Propagation and Transformation Calculus) is a 
similar method to its predecessor for compositional analysis of systems (Wallace, 
2005). A significant contribution of this approach is the enhanced syntax for the system 
failure modelling. The FPTC notation adds useful abstractions and generalisations, for 
example a wildcard character can be included to indicate any type of failure, rather than 
listing every type individually. Variables can be used, which can also represent any 
type, but their main purpose is to indicate propagation within an expression: 
( late ,  _  ) → ( low ) 
( omission ,  f  ) → (  f  ) 
This example set of expressions would be used to define the behaviour of a single 
component. The first expression describes that a late failure on the first input and any 
(specified as a wildcard, „_‟) failure on the second input causes a low failure on the 
output, and the second expression describes that a failure f is propagated to the output if 
there is an omission of the first input and failure f on the second input. The use of 
wildcards and variables make it possible to create generic expressions, a very powerful 
abstraction which achieves a greater level of reusability, certainly improved over FPTN.  
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The FPTC method requires an architectural model of the system (example in Figure 3), 
into which the components and connections have an FPTC expression assigned to them 
to describe behaviour. FPTC is designed for the domain of real-time software and 
requires that architectural descriptions are in the form of graphs, consisting of nodes 
that represent hardware and arcs that represent communication protocols. One available 
notation for developing such graphs is the Real-Time Networks formalism (Paynter et 
al., 2000). Once annotated, automated analysis can proceed with the system acting as a 
token-passing network, where tokens representing the possible failures flow from one 
component to another (Paige et al., 2009). Propagation and transformation of failure 
tokens happens at the components or connections in the model. Expressions are „run‟ 
using the tokens, and the system continues to run until the tokens no longer change.  
Failure information can thus be obtained by studying the tokens at output or specific 
points in the system. Recent work further extends the syntax of FPTC to allow 
probabilistic analysis of failures (Ge et al., 2009). This adds a probability value to each 
expression so that calculated probabilities are passed through the model in addition to 
the failure tokens. 
 
Figure 3 Example Real-Time Networks architecture (Wallace, 2005) 
The development of FPTC addresses some key deficiencies in its predecessor FPTN, 
such as the requirement to reconstruct modules due to architecture changes and the 
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context-specific nature of the failure expressions. However a difficulty is encountered 
with the propagation algorithm of FPTC; the algorithm is inductive (forward analysis 
from causes to effects) and can suffer effects of combinatorial explosion when assessing 
combinations of failures (Wolforth et al., 2010a). 
2.2.5 HiP-HOPS 
The automation of safety analysis can be very beneficial, especially considering the 
potential for elimination of any human errors in traditionally manual processes, such as 
fault tree construction. HiP-HOPS (Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and 
Propagation Studies) is a tool that performs a semi-automatic safety analysis on system 
designs (Papadopoulos et al., 2001). It is capable of synthesising fault trees and FMEAs 
from a system model which can then be used for further study within HiP-HOPS. These 
steps are fully automated, but a manual effort remains in the initial system modelling 
and failure annotation. 
In the course of the design life-cycle, HiP-HOPS can operate with progressively more 
detailed models as they are produced and refined. Thus opportunities can arise to reuse 
information gained from earlier analyses and enables a consistent and continuous 
assessment of the system as the model evolves. At the earliest stages, such a model may 
be an abstract block diagram which shows the composition of the system from a purely 
functional point of view, for instance input and output transactions among functions, 
which can be decomposed into lower level sub-functions. When functions are allocated 
to hardware components at a later stage in the development, the model will then be a 
representation of the physical architecture of the system in its entirety. Each refinement 
of the model that increases the available information about the system will yield more 
detailed analysis results from HiP-HOPS. 
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HiP-HOPS requires that potential component failures are first identified using a 
variation of the classic HAZOP technique. This initial study is used to describe 
component failure behaviour as a set of Boolean expressions relating output failures to 
their causes, such as internal malfunctions or input failures. Failures are defined by the 
analyst into classifications, typically following HAZOP types (omission, commission, 
etc.), but can be more specific if required. In the form of the expression, a class of 
failure occurring on a port (component input or output connections) is known as a 
deviation, for example: 
Omission-output = Omission-input OR Internal_malfunction 
The above expression defines a component failure where an omission of the input, or an 
internal malfunction of the component, causes an omission of the output. Sets of these 
expressions of failure behaviour are manually annotated to components in the model; 
tool support has been developed to enable this within commercial modelling software
1
. 
Once components have been annotated, their failure behaviour in combination with the 
topology of the system (from the model) is used to determine the failure propagations 
through the system, and used to automatically construct a set of fault trees for the 
system. Following this, the fault trees are automatically analysed, resulting in a table of 
minimal cut sets. Such a table is analogous to a multiple failure mode FMEA as it 
shows direct relationships between component and system failures (Papadopoulos et al., 
2004). The complete HiP-HOPS process can be seen in Figure 4. 
                                                     
1
 The HiP-HOPS tool has been shown to work with EAST-ADL2 (Chen et al., 2008), 
MATLAB/Simulink (Papadopoulos and Maruhn, 2001), and Simulation X (Uhlig et al., 2007), and is 
currently being harmonised with AADL (Feiler and Rugina, 2007). 
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The effectiveness of HiP-HOPS depends upon the component annotations; it is essential 
that appropriate failure data is used. As the only manual step, it is also susceptible to 
error. Reusability within HiP-HOPS is limited by the context-specific component failure 
behaviour expressions, though if a component expresses a general behaviour and is 
annotated thus, the expression could be reused safely along with the component. 
2.2.6 Component Fault Trees 
Though methods like HiP-HOPS give a model of the failure behaviour of a system 
represented as a set of fault trees, in the pursuit of compositional analysis, modelling 
systems at the component-level cannot be done accurately with traditional fault trees. 
Fault trees can be modularised (Wolforth, 2005), but these modules do not necessarily 
represent architectural components. The reason for this is that fault trees model paths of 
failure propagations to a root hazard, rather than the system architecture itself. 
Independent sub-trees can be extracted from a fault tree and defined as modules 
Figure 4 The HiP-HOPS process 
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(specifically sub-trees which contain no repeated events), however components are 
often influenced by other components and therefore cannot be modelled as an 
independent entity in this way. 
Component Fault Trees (CFTs) (Kaiser et al., 2003) are an extension to the traditional 
fault tree concept to allow compositional modelling and analysis. The extension is to the 
fault tree notation, so that component ports can be included within the diagram. 
Otherwise, they are the same as traditional fault trees and can have the same qualitative 
and quantitative analysis methods applied to them. Using the new notation, 
componentised fault trees are linked by input and output ports, represented as a solid 
triangle, as shown in Figure 5. Basic events are now stored in their own components as 
independent events (even if they have the same name), which manages to avoid the 
„repeated event‟ issues from traditional fault tree analysis. 
Figure 5 An example CFT 
The fault trees used in CFT are in fact a generalised form of standard fault trees (Mäckel 
and Rothfelder, 2001) called Cause Effect Graphs (CEGs). These allow the common-
cause failures (repeated events) to only need a single representation, and they also allow 
multiple top events. CEGs make CFTs smaller, clearer and easier to analyse, which are 
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significant benefits particularly when modelling larger systems. In (Heilmann et al., 
2007), CFTs are used in an industrial case, analysing a railway braking system. In this 
report, the automatic generation of CFTs helped to manage complexity arising from a 
large number of combinations of subsystems.  
As components are independent, their behaviour is encapsulated and they can be 
developed separately, assuming the necessary ports for fault tree components have been 
determined. These features come together to create a reusable component concept for 
fault trees and analysis, with the added advantage that the decomposition is from system 
to sub-components, which is generally more intuitive than from top event to basic 
events.  
2.2.7 State-Event Fault Trees 
Traditional fault trees do not have the ability to model the temporal order of events, i.e. 
sequences of events or states and transitions; they only model static behaviour. State-
Event Fault Trees (SEFTs) (Kaiser and Gramlich, 2004) are an evolution of CFTs and 
allow the modelling of dynamic failure behaviour
2
. The ability to represent system 
states and state transitions within a fault tree leads to a much more in-depth and accurate 
analysis. This is particularly important for systems with a real-time element, where the 
traditional combinatorial fault tree is not suitable for modelling such dynamic 
behaviour. It allows a true representation of the actual functioning of a typical system, 
for example the sequence of events and their effect on the failure behaviour. The 
difficulty however lies in capturing, representing and analysing the SEFTs. An example 
SEFT is shown in Figure 6. 
                                                     
2
 Modelling of dynamic behaviour and associated temporal analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
nevertheless it is worth mentioning as an example of contemporary safety analysis. 
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Figure 6 Example SEFT from (Kaiser et al., 2007) 
SEFTs extend the standard fault tree notation and add graphical elements for the 
representation of states and events, and also temporal and causal edges to the graph; an 
important distinction here is that states and events are not necessarily failures of a 
component. This extended notation also includes and extends the port concept from 
component fault trees, where they are now refined into state ports and event ports. 
Therefore the level of achievable reuse is similar to that found in CFTs. 
Traditional fault trees can be analysed with various methods by manipulation of the 
underlying Boolean expression structure. However SEFTs are only analysed by first 
transforming the tree into Deterministic and Stochastic Petri Nets (DSPNs) (Ciardo and 
Lindermann, 1993). Currently, further analysis of the DSPNs is performed by external 
tools e.g. TimeNET (German and Mitzlaff, 1995), but work is being done on the 
integration and automation of these methods (Kaiser et al., 2007). The detail required 
for analysis using SEFTs mean that the technique is susceptible to state-space explosion 
problems and so performance suffers (Grunske et al., 2005). This problem can be 
addressed to some extent by a dual-analysis technique, whereby the static parts of the 
system are analysed with combinatorial FTA algorithms and the dynamic parts analysed 
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by the more powerful methods mentioned previously. The effectiveness of this 
approach is however highly dependent on the type of system under analysis. 
2.2.8 Safety Case Patterns and composable safety cases 
The traditional safety case is a document that argues and presents evidence for the 
safety of a system, however when the system is large and complex, the safety case is 
generally large and complex also. Managing changes to the safety case throughout the 
life of a system can be challenging, with changes to regulatory requirements, additional 
safety evidence and changing designs all affecting the original argument (Kelly and 
McDermid, 2001). Successful arguments from prior studies are often reused in order to 
simplify the construction of the safety case, but problems can arise with its management 
when an ad hoc, „cut & paste‟ approach has been employed in the development (Kelly 
and McDermid, 1998). To address these problems, the concept of Safety Case Patterns 
(Kelly and McDermid, 1997) has been developed to ease the production of safety cases 
by using a more abstract approach to the general construction principles. Along with a 
graphical notation to help guide the development of safety cases, these extensions to the 
method aim to promote reuse and resolve some issues of the manual construction 
process. 
Safety Case Patterns (example Figure 7) are essentially templates for the construction of 
safety case arguments, given in the GSN format, with added documentation. The overall 
format is based on design patterns (Gamma et al., 1995) with some adaptation for the 
description. For instance, included in the documentation is applicability information for 
describing the circumstances under which the pattern should be applied. Also sample 
text is given for the safety case under development, similar to example source code in 
design patterns.  
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Figure 7 Hazard Avoidance Pattern from (Kelly and McDermid, 1997) 
Safety Case Patterns can certainly enable a degree of reuse and aid in the development 
of safety cases, but despite these additions, safety case construction is still a laborious 
manual process.  
To achieve a greater benefit from the compositional design of safety critical systems, a 
compositional approach to safety case development is required (Kelly, 2001). The GSN 
has been extended further with elements that enable the modular construction and 
representation of safety cases. The interfaces between modules are the crucial element 
for composable safety cases. A safety case module interface, as specified by (Kelly, 
2001), must contain: 
1. Objectives addressed by the module 
2. Evidence presented within the module 
3. Context defined within the module 
4. Arguments requiring support from other modules 
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Inter-module dependencies: 
5. Reliance on objectives addressed elsewhere 
6. Reliance on evidence presented elsewhere 
7. Reliance on context defined elsewhere 
These elements are required for an interface to be properly defined and thus to ensure 
the composed argument will be consistent, especially when modules are reused across 
applications. The principal benefit to modularising a safety case is managing change, 
i.e. maintainability. With a compositional approach, changes can be isolated to a set of 
modules, as opposed to traditional safety cases where changes may have an impact that 
necessitates the safety case be reassessed. Clearly, Safety Case Patterns and composable 
safety cases address some of the main difficulties with safety case maintenance, and 
achieve an improved and managed approach to reuse. 
2.2.9 AADL 
The Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) (Feiler et al., 2006) forms the 
core of what is an extensive tool for the specification and analysis of dependable 
systems. It was originally developed for formally describing real-time embedded 
avionic systems, thus it includes modern features such as the capability for hierarchical 
modelling of software and hardware components and their interactions. It is an industry 
standard for avionics and other embedded real-time systems. The language is 
extendable, and one such extension which is of particular interest is the Error Model 
Annex (Feiler and Rugina, 2007). This provides a sub-language for the creation of error 
models, describing errors and failure behaviours of components, which are then 
associated with components in an architectural model. The intention of the error model 
annex is to provide support for qualitative and quantitative analysis of dependability 
attributes (Rugina, 2005).  
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An AADL model can represent hierarchies of components or subsystems, and so an 
error model‟s representation also extends from the system to component level. An error 
model will describe the state changes a component will experience when presented with 
a particular fault, either from an internal source or propagated from another component. 
An example of an AADL Error Model is given in Figure 8.  
 
 
When a system‟s architectural model is combined with the system‟s error model, 
automated analysis can be performed by one of several available methods, or by other 
AADL extensions. These include, for example, fault tree generation (Joshi et al., 2007) 
and Generalised Stochastic Petri Nets (Rugina et al., 2007), the latter used for 
modelling dynamic or state-based behaviour. 
error model Example1 
features 
ErrorFree:  initial error state; 
Failed: error state; 
Fail, Repair: error event; 
CorruptedData: out error propagation 
{Occurrence => fixed 0.8}; 
end Example1; 
 
error model implementation Example1.basic 
transitions 
ErrorFree-[Fail]->Failed; 
Failed-[out CorruptedData]->Failed; 
Failed-[Repair]->ErrorFree; 
properties 
Occurrence => poisson 1.0e-3 applies to Fault; 
Occurrence => poisson 1.0e-4 applies to Repair; 
end Example1.basic; 
Figure 8 Example AADL Error Model (Feiler and Rugina, 2007) 
51 
 
A useful feature is that error models can be stored in a library, which provides a 
repository for the component association and thus provides a degree of managed reuse. 
There are two types of reusable error model; the basic model, which defines component 
error states and how they change due to error events and propagations, and the derived 
model which defines the error state of a component in terms of the error states of its 
subcomponents. The error models that are reusable, as far as the annex allows, still have 
architecture dependencies due to component-specific properties in the model definition. 
The onus then remains on the analyst to ensure that error models are reused 
appropriately. 
2.2.10 Formal Verification for Safety Analysis  
The contemporary methods discussed so far are similar in that they are all capable of 
compositional safety analyses. There is however another class of methods used for 
safety analysis that must be discussed; these are formal verification techniques which 
support safety analysis. Like other compositional methods, these use a model as input, 
but can perform an analysis with simpler information about failures; only local failure 
modes are required, with propagation of failures inferred from the model.  
Formal verification techniques are widely used and provide a greater degree of 
automation, but are not without their drawbacks. Generally, formal verification 
techniques are inductive, working from cause to effect. In contrast to a deductive 
approach, this can lead to combinatorial explosion when combinations of failure modes 
are analysed. The processing requirements for these methods are also far more 
computationally expensive due to the extensive checking that must be performed. 
Nevertheless, these methods are valid and have their place among the contemporary 
safety analysis techniques (Lisagor et al., 2006). 
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One such method, simulation, automatically derives failure information about a system 
from the algorithmic execution of a functional model. The aim is to find out how the 
system may perform if it were operating as designed, providing information about 
reliability, availability and maintainability. The simulation process may require a 
considerable amount of time, particularly as a model must be subjected to repeated 
executions in order to gain reliable data. The multiple runs can generate large sets of 
results, but the main drawback here is that potentially not all failures are found even 
with multiple executions (Price and Taylor, 2002).  
Another common method used in industry for formal verification is model checking. 
The basic principle of the process requires that a system and its properties are expressed 
as a mathematical model and are checked for meeting safety requirements through 
computational algorithms. Model-checking can be used to automatically prove safety 
properties at any stage of a model‟s development. A general view of the process is given 
in Figure 9. The „model‟ here refers to a representation of system requirements (what 
the system does) or design (how it does it), which along with the system properties (the 
properties to be checked, i.e. safety properties that must be „true‟) are used as input to a 
model-checking tool. The result of the evaluation outputs positive if the model satisfies 
these properties, or if they are not satisfied, a counter-example is produced by the tool. 
Through detailed examination of the counter-example, problems can be pin-pointed and 
a model can be manually corrected so that the system properties will be satisfied on 
repeated application of the model-checker.  
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Figure 9 Process of model-checking 
Model-checking can be useful in safety analyses, one such ability being the formal 
checking of fault trees (Thums and Schellhorn, 2003). Thums and Schellhorn define 
fault tree semantics which formalise fault tree events; logic gates in a tree are assigned a 
„correctness‟ and a „completeness‟. Correctness is a guarantee that sub-events lead to 
the top event and completeness is a guarantee that only those sub-events lead to the top 
event, i.e. no causes have been missed during the analysis. Any omissions in the tree are 
found as a counter-example by the model checker. In another example, model-checking 
was used very successfully on NASA‟s DEEP SPACE 1 system (Havelund et al., 
1999), finding several previously unknown errors. 
FSAP/NuSMV (Formal Safety Analysis Platform, Symbolic Model Verifier) (Bozzano 
and Villafiorita, 2003), for example, is a tool for automating safety analyses which 
combines several techniques. It can perform automatic fault tree generation and model 
verification and aims to provide a platform that can be used throughout the development 
of a safety critical system from its design through to the assessment of its safety 
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properties. The platform requires a formally-written model of the system for validating 
the functional requirements, which can be extended to include component failure modes 
for safety analyses. A useful feature is that generic safety requirements are stored in a 
library included with the tool, from which predefined failure modes can be included into 
a model.  
A key drawback of model-checking techniques are that output results require manual 
verification, due to the fact that „false negatives‟ can occur with an incorrect input 
model or specification (Clarke et al., 1999), e.g. a mistake in the input can lead to the 
model checker producing a negative result based upon the erroneous input. Thus the 
result has to be verified against the input to determine if it is a valid counter-example.  
Another approach which is based upon model checking is failure injection. In this 
method, failure modes are added to a model in the same manner as a component (hence 
„injected‟).  When a model is executed/run, a failure mode can be active or not, with the 
model checker controlling the activation of the failure modes, for example if all failure 
modes are deactivated, the model will exhibit its normal behaviour. The model checker 
will produce a list of failure modes that violate a requirement, which is similar to a list 
of minimal cut sets produced from FTA.  
Formal verification provides „true‟ automated analysis (Lisagor et al., 2006), and 
provides an implicit guarantee of „correctness‟ of analysis results. Early lifecycle 
models can be used by these techniques however the problem faced by such methods is 
the potential complexity of input models, resulting in a computationally expensive 
process.  
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2.2.11 Comparison of classical and contemporary safety analysis 
Classical safety analysis methods were developed primarily to support analysts working 
in the aerospace and nuclear industries. The techniques have found lasting success by 
providing straightforward methods that yield useful results for safety assessment.  
Some of the earliest methods, for example FMEA and its variants, are still usefully 
employed for hazard identification and relating causes of failure to their effects. Fault 
tree analysis improves on the inductive tabular methods by providing a deductive 
analysis of failure combination and propagation throughout a system. This and the 
subsequent analysis of fault trees provide effective means for identification and analysis 
of root causes of hazardous failures and their likelihood. FTA has become one of the 
most widely used safety analysis methods today.  
Methods that are simpler to perform generally yield less detailed results, but as safety 
critical systems have tended to become far larger and more complex over time, the 
classical methods have encountered problems when faced with the increased complexity 
found in modern systems. The general difficulties shared by all the classical methods 
are: 
 the manual production of results and their potential to be of great volume; such 
large sets of data make the manual interpretation and adequate management of 
results very difficult. This also makes errors more likely in very large analyses. 
 the maintainability of analyses; when changes are made to a system, analyses 
have to be performed again, or results reconstructed, either way resulting in 
substantial extra effort. 
Another issue is the time required and high cost of analyses; due to these factors, a 
safety analysis is typically only performed after a design is finalised. Although this will 
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yield the required safety information about the final system, it leads to further increases 
in costs and development time when problems are found and redesigns are necessary. 
As complexity inevitably continues to increase, the difficulty in applying classical 
methods increases further (Papadopoulos et al., 2001). 
The contemporary approaches bring into safety analysis improvements, extensions and 
new techniques developed to address those drawbacks of the classical methods. The 
modern compositional approach to safety analysis began in the mid-1990s. Since then, 
continuing developments have been made resulting in several different methods, each 
tackling the problems of managing complexity in their own way. Compositionality is a 
common feature; with the trend for complex systems to have a composable design 
incorporating reusable, off-the-shelf components, compositional analysis seems to be a 
reasonable way of rationalising complex safety assessments. As a result, contemporary 
methods are capable of performing analyses at the component or subsystem level and 
aim to provide some reuse via their compositionality.  
It is common for compositional safety analysis methods to make use of an early 
architectural design model of a system to perform their analyses, which saves time, 
effort and cost. A major benefit over the classical methods is this allows a degree of 
automation in analyses. An alternative approach is to have safety properties formally 
verified using model-checkers. However, in this approach the analysis is typically 
inductive or requires exhaustive state-space exploration, which makes the analysis 
prone to combinatorial explosion and reduces the scalability of the approach (Wolforth 
et al., 2010a). At a higher level there is the safety case; a set of complex documents 
which put forward arguments and evidence of a systems‟ dependability, gathered from 
sources including the results of other analyses. Here there have been significant 
developments with regards to reusability and compositionality. 
57 
 
In summary, there are many approaches to checking that a system meets its safety 
requirements. The classical methods developed from various industries (chemical, 
nuclear) have yielded useful methods that are still used today. Recognising some of 
their drawbacks, improvements have been made to allow more manageable analyses of 
larger scale, more complex systems, typical of those found in modern day safety critical 
systems. The most important improvements seen with contemporary approaches are: 
 enhanced failure notation 
 improved representation of failures and architecture 
 compositionality 
 automation to reduce the manual effort and improve accuracy 
Clearly, improving reusability and managing reuse effectively are important and current 
areas of research modern safety analysis techniques. To help better understand the 
issues of reuse, the next section examines successful techniques for reuse found in 
other, more mature domains. 
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2.3 Reuse 
Reuse is a widely used and very useful concept in many areas of modern engineering. 
There are various methods, types and scope for reuse, but reuse can generally be defined 
as the repeated application of some aspect of a system within the same or across various 
designs. The major motivation for reuse is often financial; being able to reuse a solution 
can save large amounts of money on resources and implementation costs. As for the 
implementation itself, there is also the potential benefit of reusing the experience and 
knowledge of the operational factors such as reliability and maintainability of a 
particular component. This is a particularly important consideration when reusing 
mechanical components. For example, once the design of such a component had proven 
its robustness in an operating environment, identical components could be included in 
other systems with a degree of confidence. For safety critical applications, these factors 
are extremely important, so there is a motivation to reuse wherever possible. 
In the ideal scenario, reuse would allow the transfer of information across a variety of 
applications, but in practice it is very difficult to achieve. For a mechanical device, the 
operating environment can have a major influence on the performance of the 
components. Knowledge gained from one environment may not necessarily apply to 
another, for example due to a difference in ambient temperature. To overcome such 
practical problems, and in recognition of the benefits of reusability, mechanical 
components are typically designed to operate within tolerances. Designing a component 
to operate within a range of tolerances, rather than to fit a specific value, improves the 
likelihood that the component can be reused in other environments. This is an example 
where a generalisation of a property can increase the scope for reuse. This concept of 
generalisation is not limited to mechanical engineering; electronic and even software 
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components can be constructed with a more general specification meaning they can be 
more easily reused. 
In the remainder of this section, the scope of reuse within safety critical systems and 
safety analysis is summarised, and the level of reuse achievable in more mature domains 
is discussed, with a particular focus on software engineering. 
2.3.2 Reuse in safety critical systems and analyses 
Though careful design is essential, reuse (often ad hoc) still occurs within safety critical 
systems (Bush and Finkelstein, 2001). The reason is that the general advantages of reuse 
in other fields still apply, such as time and cost savings, but perhaps more importantly, 
the greater benefit of reuse within dependable systems is the „trusted‟ aspect. If a 
solution is known to be dependable, perhaps from an observation of its operation as part 
of another system over a period of time, then it is often justifiable to apply the solution 
to the same problem when it is encountered again. More generally, it is desirable to use 
components that have well-known safety properties. 
The assumption for subsequent safety analyses is that if components are reused, any 
associated information about safety properties can also be reused. However, because a 
change in the system context may introduce new factors, for example further influence 
from other components, it is not safe to assume that safety properties would hold. So 
even where component reuse is possible, failure behaviour will likely need to be 
reassessed in new applications. Re-specifying behaviour is no trivial task; despite 
attempts at generalising the descriptions of component failure behaviour, in most cases 
the methods still require context-specific descriptions. The FPTC method for example 
has improved on this by including some abstract syntax elements; generic references 
can be made using special symbols in expressions. Furthermore the compositional 
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approach of modern safety analysis methods includes reusable elements, but the actual 
level of reuse achievable is fairly limited.  
Levels of reuse can be put into classifications (Karunanithi and Bieman, 1993). If an 
element is reused without any modification, it is known as verbatim reuse. In other 
cases, reuse can take place subject to some modification, which is known as leveraged 
reuse. Trivial reuse is a variation of leveraged reuse, restricted to cases where only small 
modifications take place (Smith and Harrison 2005). Recognising this, allowing some 
flexibility with regards to what is reused makes at least some degree of reuse more 
feasible, but the difficulty then lies in how to carry out reuse appropriately.  
In (Kelly and McDermid, 1997), the problems of manual safety case construction are 
discussed. They highlight the ad hoc style reuse that is commonly found; an analyst 
decides if a problem is „similar enough‟ to another that a prior solution can be used in a 
new application. Though this may occasionally be successful, it ultimately becomes a 
„cut & paste‟ approach to reuse and is simply unreliable, potentially leading to bad 
implementations. The idea that this kind of reuse is common in other types of analysis is 
suggested in (Bush and Finkelstein, 2001). It can be inferred from this work that a lack 
of systematic management is a major obstacle towards improving the scope of reuse in 
safety analysis. 
Extensions to safety cases (Kelly and McDermid, 1998) have introduced a pattern 
concept to enable a degree of reuse by structuring how a safety case could be developed 
using prior arguments. It works by giving a documented solution to a common 
construction problem as a set of systematic guidelines for the analyst to follow. 
Although safety cases operate at a higher level, this approach to reuse can also apply to 
compositional safety analysis techniques. 
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There can still be some concerns even with a systematic approach to reuse however; 
supporting experience must be gathered first, and correctness must be rigorously 
checked. This still leaves the questions: where does responsibility lie if a problem is 
discovered? Are problems a result of a design fault or an inappropriately reused 
component? In the scope of this thesis, these concerns cannot be resolved; a certain 
degree of responsibility is assumed on the part of the analyst to ensure correctness.  
2.3.3 Reuse in Software Engineering 
Contemporary safety analysis introduces compositionality, along with partially 
automated techniques to improve the reusability and reliability of analyses, but their 
overall success has been limited. The focus of this thesis is to develop a language for 
describing failure behaviour that allows greater reuse of behaviour expressions than 
currently found in contemporary methods, along with a robust mechanism for the well-
managed application of reuse. Based on this, as the investigation leads to generalised 
and abstract language constructs, it is useful to look at developments in the field of 
software engineering, which is a more mature domain and includes extensive 
mechanisms for managed reuse of program code. 
Reusability is a very important and extensively used concept within software 
development. Modern software projects can be very complex and require programs with 
millions of lines of code. Creating programs of this size has forced developers to adopt 
more rigorous approaches to software design. 
Improving the scope of code reuse was the primary aim of developing object-oriented 
(OO) programming. Bringing functions and associated data together created the concept 
of classes, which is the core of the OO paradigm. The idea is that a class becomes a 
reusable element, possibly a trusted solution to a software problem. To an extent, OO 
design can bring compositionality to software. It also provides the foundation for the 
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more advanced reuse features. For example, a powerful technique for managed reuse 
within OO programming is the concept of inheritance. Inheritance allows new classes to 
be created from existing classes by specifying a hierarchy of relationships. When one 
class inherits from another, it means that certain properties are shared between them. A 
new class (the derived class) can inherit data and/or functions from an existing class (the 
base class) thereby reusing existing specifications. A class hierarchy can be constructed 
in several ways, giving rise to different types of inheritance. The simplest form is single 
inheritance, where there is a single base class inherited by a single derived class. This 
simple hierarchy can be extended further with the derived class itself being inherited to 
create another class, known as multi-level inheritance. A more complex hierarchy can 
go further and create classes which take attributes from more than one type, called 
multiple inheritance, where a derived class inherits from more than one base class. 
When these types of inheritance, multi-level and multiple, are used within the same 
hierarchy, it is known as hybrid inheritance.  As well as for code reuse, inheritance is a 
useful method for managing changes, for example any change made to the parent base 
class will be immediately inherited by all derived classes. 
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Figure 10 Inheritance in object-oriented programming 
For example in Figure 10, all derived classes contain function_x(). This is a useful 
feature for creating specialisations of a type which are all compatible within the 
inheritance hierarchy. 
At a higher level of software design, there is another type of reusable element, the 
design pattern (Gamma et al., 1995). These are structured combinations of interacting 
classes that when implemented, are known to provide solutions to recurring design 
problems. A design pattern consists of a diagram, illustrating the flow of control and 
data between classes, and documentation about how and when the pattern should be 
applied. Design patterns capture solutions that have evolved over time, based on 
acquired expertise, experience and successful approaches to prior software problems. 
By providing this knowledge in a structured way, with appropriate documentation to 
guide their usage, design patterns can speed up software development. 
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Choosing an applicable pattern for a solution is itself no easy task, so as a collection 
they are catalogued and organised into categories that define the purpose and scope of a 
pattern. Creating a catalogue like this makes it easier to find the solution to a problem, 
giving a good foundation to managing appropriate reuse. 
There are some drawbacks with using design patterns, the most obvious being that they 
are not directly implementable solutions; they serve as knowledge reuse rather than 
literal reuse and are therefore a template for developers to base their implementation on 
(Gamma et al., 1995). The idea is to show the interactions of classes for commonly 
occurring problems, but it is left up to the developer to follow the implementation 
guidelines and provide the actual program code. Potentially this undermines the 
reusability, at least in terms of a reliable solution, as it can easily introduce errors with 
the manual implementation. 
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2.4 Summary of literature review 
There are several methods that are used for safety analysis. The classical methods have 
evolved over time, leading to the state-of-the-art contemporary methods available today 
that are capable of modelling complex, compositional systems. Some are based on 
failure logic models, using deductive methods to trace failures through a system. 
Alternatively there are methods which perform formal verification of models to 
inductively check safety properties. 
Performing a safety analysis of these types of system typically requires a team of 
analysts. It is often expensive and time-consuming, yet it is still a necessary process. 
Some methods allow a degree of automation, to aid analyses and reduce the possibility 
for human error, but there is still a manual element to each technique. This is partly the 
motivation for attempts to improve the way safety analyses are performed, the most 
prominent being the model-based approach. 
Reusability has been a major influence in the development of these methods. To reflect 
the compositional architecture of designs, analysis techniques have themselves become 
compositional in response. The aim is to reflect the same type of literal reuse of 
architectural components as similarly reusable analysis elements, for example reusing 
associated definitions of „well-known‟ component failure behaviour across analyses 
without modification. This is particularly desirable in the domain of safety critical 
systems where there is the motivation to use „trusted‟ components within designs. 
However, achieving this type of reuse has proven very difficult with a suitable degree of 
confidence within current methods. State-of-the-art safety analysis methods, rather than 
focussing on literal component reuse, make some attempts to capture and reuse 
knowledge of component failure behaviour, often defined as a logical expression.  
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One aspect where problems arise is with context-specificity of definitions of failure 
behaviour which prevents information from one application being used in another 
design. Generalisation and abstraction seen in some methods are concepts used to 
improve reusability by attempting to remove the context dependence. The intention is 
that a more general analysis element would be applicable across a range of studies. 
However attempts at abstraction or generalisation in any scenario require additional 
documentation to guide the user in its application, thus it is also essential to consider 
how reuse is actually performed. 
The limiting factor here is an overall lack of a well-defined, managed approach to 
reusing safety analyses. The prime example is the „cut & paste‟ approach to reuse where 
the analyst makes the (possibly incorrect) observation that certain components are 
similar enough for failure data to be reused when in fact it is not appropriate to do so. 
The lack of rigour in the process means that when reuse is performed, it is often in an ad 
hoc manner. These are the two most important problems that must be considered in a 
new approach; enabling knowledge reuse of component failure behaviour and 
establishing a systematic method for performing reuse. 
The second part of the chapter focused on reuse in general, with attention paid to 
reusability concepts as found in software engineering. The concept of inheritance was of 
particular interest in this study, being a mechanism that can be used in order to manage 
reuse more effectively. Inheritance enables reuse by creating a specialisation derived 
from a more general base type. Employing this within safety analysis and component 
annotations,  creating a reuse mechanism based on inheritance may provide an effective 
way to manage the reuse process. Another useful feature found in software engineering 
is Design Patterns; reusable elements that capture general solutions to commonly 
occurring software problems, and provide documentation along with a diagram to guide 
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their implementation. They are not directly implementable themselves, rather they are 
an example of where knowledge has been captured and expressed in a reusable format. 
Attempting to enable these kinds of features within a safety analysis method 
necessitates that a more abstract approach to expressing failure behaviour is developed. 
Lessons learned from the literature review imply this can be done via the creation of a 
generalised language for the description of component failure behaviour within an 
established safety analysis method. Inductive methods (i.e. formal verification) were 
deemed unsuitable for this development, mainly due to their inherent problems of 
combinatorial explosion.  
The HiP-HOPS technique is a deductive method and a good candidate for this 
development because its annotation syntax can be easily extended and provide a more 
easily readable syntax. A generalised syntax will allow collective, generic statements to 
be made about failure behaviour which should hold in any application context, but it is 
important to realise this may not be possible for all components and failure types. As a 
final step to ensure appropriate and managed reuse, it is essential to develop a system of 
documentation to guide the application of generalised expressions. Taking all these 
points into account, the following requirements for an extended language are as follows: 
1. The syntax must allow generalisations to be made which can define 
behaviour, as far as possible, independently of context 
2.   Can be automatically parsed without sacrificing readability 
3.   Be well documented, including systematic rules for guiding reuse 
4.   Remain compatible with the current annotation language within HiP-HOPS 
In conclusion, the aims of the thesis have been focused and a set of requirements for 
what a new approach should include have been defined. In the next chapter, these 
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requirements are taken and developed into a new method for managed reuse alongside a 
robust safety analysis technique; a reusable, generalised language extension to the HiP-
HOPS tool. 
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3 A Generalised Failure Logic 
extension to HiP-HOPS 
The first part of this chapter explores the HiP-HOPS analysis process to discover the 
limitations of the classical component annotation syntax. Following this, it is shown 
how generalisations of component failure behaviour can be made, captured and 
expressed within an extended annotation syntax. Further, it is shown how sets of failure 
behaviour expressions created with the generalised syntax can be encapsulated and 
managed with documentation so that a pattern concept can be applied to component 
annotation.  
3.1 Safety Analysis in HiP-HOPS 
Performing a HiP-HOPS study on a system involves three main phases: 
 System modelling and failure annotation 
 Model parsing and fault tree synthesis  
 Fault tree analysis and FMEA generation 
The first stage is manual and comprises development of the system model and the 
establishment of the local failure behaviour for each component. The local behaviour 
describes how the component responds to failures generated internally or received at its 
inputs having been propagated from other components. In HIP-HOPS, this is expressed 
as effects of internal and input failures on the component‟s own outputs. A variant of 
HAZOP (Kletz, 1997) is used to initially identify the possible component output failures 
and their causes. During this preliminary study, the types of failures, the set of failure 
classes, to be examined can be defined. These types will depend upon the context and 
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application of the system, but in the general case these can be the familiar HAZOP-style 
classifiers, i.e. provision, value, timing. 
In the classical annotation syntax, there is the general assumption that every component 
has a set of inputs and delivers a set of outputs. This forms the basis of the logical 
expressions which relate deviations of output to their respective causes and allows the 
set of fault trees for the system to be synthesised. Component failure behaviour is 
annotated into a model as a set of logical expressions; these can include Boolean 
operators such as conjunction (AND) and disjunction (OR) to describe combinations of 
failures, for example: 
Omission-o1 = Omission-i1 OR Internal_Failure 
An expression like the above relates an output deviation (the left-hand side) to its causes 
(right-hand side), which can be deviations of inputs, internal malfunctions, or any 
combination of these. In this case, the output deviation, the omission of output o1, is 
caused by an omission of input i1 or by a basic event, an internal failure of the 
component. More detail can be included by specifying the parameters of the deviations; 
connections between components may have more than one attribute, which necessitates 
the definition of the extra detail. For example in a hydraulic system, the fluid flow, 
pressure and temperature may all need to be monitored between connected components, 
therefore expressions may be needed which refer specifically to an individual attribute, 
e.g. a low value for the pressure may cause a failure of the hydraulics to operate 
correctly. 
Once the modelling and subsequent annotation is complete, HiP-HOPS performs its 
automated analysis steps. The topology of the model is used to automatically determine 
how the local failure behaviour, specified by the component annotations, causes failures 
to propagate through connections in the model and ultimately cause functional failures 
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at the system output. This global view of failure is captured deductively (effects to 
causes) in a set of fault trees, synthesised from the model traversal. Finally, qualitative 
or quantitative analysis can be automatically performed on the fault trees to establish 
whether the system meets its safety or reliability requirements. A table equivalent to a 
multiple failure FMEA can then be automatically obtained from the fault tree logic, 
recording for each component in the system and for each failure mode of that 
component, any direct effects on the system and any further effects caused in 
conjunction with other failure events.  
As HiP-HOPS is capable of providing safety information at each stage in the evolution 
of a design, it would be useful to reuse expressions of failure behaviour, where possible, 
to save the effort of re-annotating components in all design iterations. The more general 
a failure expression is, the more easily it could be reused in this way. The major 
difficulty with this, and with deviation-based failure logic modelling in general, is that 
the modelling is dependent on the nominal behaviour of the system and the nominal 
behaviour is then dependent on the application context and state. In practice this means 
that the nominal behaviour can change and so reliable reuse of specific failure logic is 
difficult to achieve. However, creating generalisations of failure logic can be achieved 
and thus help guide and improve the efficiency of creating models in step with designs. 
3.1.1 Fuel System example 
An example of HiP-HOPS analysis of a simple fuel system is given in this section to 
highlight what is currently achievable with the annotation syntax, its limitations, areas 
where the syntax could be extended to enable a greater degree of generalisation and 
therefore where possibilities lie to achieve greater reuse of failure expressions. 
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Figure 11 Fuel System 
The fuel system in Figure 11 is designed to continually provide an output flow of fuel, 
with a provision for some fault tolerance. Pathways for power, control and fuel flow are 
replicated for redundancy, so that fuel will continue to flow as long as there is sufficient 
power to the system and a correct control signal is delivered to an operational pump. 
Control signals pass through an embedded logic system that can compensate for a 
permanent failure of one bus. Any missing control signal from one bus is synthesised 
from the other bus, meaning signal omissions are only propagated when both buses fail 
together. Commission failures (an unintended signal) cannot be detected or corrected 
with this logic system, so these will always propagate to the pumps. The use of two 
pumps means that an omission of output can only occur if both pumps fail, whereas a 
commission of output can occur if only one pump experiences a commission failure. 
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Table 3 Fuel System annotations 
The system as a whole is powered by a series of redundant power supply units (PSUs) 
routed through a single power bus. This design allows for additional redundant PSUs to 
be added as required, or for failed PSUs to be replaced without power disruption to the 
system. This feature also allows provision for a finalised number of PSUs to be 
specified in a later iteration of the design. Individual PSU failure can be tolerated, but 
multiple PSU failures will result in total power loss for the system. 
PSU 
 
Omission-out = PSU_failed 
 
Power Bus 
 
Omission-out1 = Omission-in1 AND Omission-in2 AND Omission-in3 
Omission-out2 = Omission-in1 AND Omission-in2 AND Omission-in3 
Omission-out3 = Omission-in1 AND Omission-in2 AND Omission-in3 
 
Computer 
 
Omission-out1-sig = Omission-power OR computer_failure 
Omission-out2-sig = Omission-power OR computer_failure 
Commission-out1-sig = memory_stuck 
Commission-out2-sig = memory_stuck 
 
Data Bus 
 
Omission-out-sig = Omission-in-sig OR bus_failed 
Commission-out-sig = Commission-in-sig 
 
Logic 
 
Omission-out-sig = Omission-in1-sig AND Omission-in2-sig 
Commission-out-sig = Commission-in1-sig OR Commission-in2-sig 
 
Valve 
 
Omission-out = Omission-in OR stuck_closed 
Commission-out = Commission-in OR stuck_open 
 
Pump 
 
Omission-out = Omission-in OR Omission-control OR 
      Omission-power OR stuck_closed 
Commission-out = Commission-control OR stuck_open 
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This case study focuses only on two classes of failure, omission and commission; 
therefore the system failure modes studied are the omission or commission of fuel flow. 
For example the manner in which failures propagate through the system means that PSU 
failure can lead to pump failure and hence an omission of output. The full failure 
behaviour for the system is given in Table 3.  
The PSU has a single failure mode with one application-independent cause; an internal 
failure stops the PSU from providing power at its output, which could occur within any 
system which uses the PSU. It is possible that as each PSU in the system is identical, 
they can share the same annotation, which is true in the context of this example. 
Likewise for other replicated components within the same system, they can share the 
annotations of their identical counterparts. Those expressions can be stored and re-
applied whenever the associated component is used in a model. 
The power bus has its failure behaviour described, as in Table 3, with three expressions. 
Observing the common structure within each of these expressions, there is a common 
behaviour; every output deviation is brought about by the same input deviation cause. 
Using natural language, it is possible to describe the component‟s behaviour in a more 
general manner „an omission of any output is caused by an omission of all inputs‟. This 
generic behaviour has no dependency on the application context and will therefore hold 
in any system that incorporates the power bus. Therefore it can be considered to be a 
very simple, reusable pattern of behaviour. Indeed it is possible to see more forms of 
general behaviour and patterns in the example system. 
The computer can experience omission and commission failures on both its outputs, and 
each type has the same cause on either port. For instance the commission failure on 
either output port is caused by the same internal „memory stuck‟ failure. In more 
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general terms, it could be said that the „memory stuck‟ failure causes a commission on 
any output port. 
The individual data buses in this system will propagate any type of failure received at its 
input to its output. In this case the activation signal „sig‟ for the fuel pumps can either 
be omitted or present though undesired; this is equally true for any other signal that the 
data bus component may transmit in any context, thus it can be generally said that the 
same erroneous input signal will be propagated to the output. Furthermore, for this 
example component, the behaviour will hold for any number of inputs and outputs the 
bus may have, so it can be said that an omission on any input of a signal will propagate 
as an omission of the same signal at a corresponding output, and likewise for 
commission failures. 
A logic controller in this system will only propagate an omission failure if it occurs on 
both its inputs. For instance an omission of output is caused when an omission occurs 
on all inputs, a conjunction of signal omissions on „in1‟ and „in2‟. A commission failure 
will propagate when at least one input, i.e. any input, receives an unintended signal. 
The valves controlling the input flow of fuel have a very basic failure behaviour which 
is valid for any system in which one is used. For instance the valve can experience basic 
failures of being either stuck open, leading to a potential commission of output flow, or 
stuck closed, leading to a potential omission of output flow. The precise material whose 
flow is being controlled is not relevant for an expression of the valve‟s failure 
behaviour, thus the existing annotations will hold in any application and do not need to 
be further generalised; they can be stored and reused along with the valve component. 
The pumps will fail to deliver an output in response to an omission of any of its inputs, 
the input flow, the control signal or the power source, or if the pump itself is stuck 
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closed. Undesired output from the pumps can occur if there is an undesired activation of 
the pump control or if the pump is stuck open. 
Under analysis in HiP-HOPS, potential design flaws in the system would be discovered, 
such as the single point of failure „computer failure‟. This may force design changes to 
be considered, leading for example to the addition of a redundant backup computer to 
provide a fail-safe mechanism in the event one computer suffers this failure, avoiding an 
otherwise complete system failure. 
3.1.2 Limits of HiP-HOPS component annotation 
The general case is that component annotations as in Table 3 have very limited 
applicability, e.g. the expressions only apply to this system and are not transferrable into 
another study, but there are situations, like with the PSU and valve components, where 
it is possible to reuse annotations developed with the current syntax. Even so, such 
reuse is somewhat ad hoc and clearly not subject to a rigorous process; an aspect 
identified previously as being essential to achieving a suitable method for reuse.  
Capturing behaviour using the original HiP-HOPS annotation syntax typically requires 
multiple expressions containing combinations of events. This is sufficient to fully 
describe a system‟s failure behaviour, as seen with the fuel system example; however it 
can become a burden, particularly with regard to reusability of expressions. For instance 
the power and data buses have a failure behaviour which is independent of the 
application context, however their annotations would have to be completely 
reconstructed if additional components were connected to them in a modified design to 
take into account the extra potential failure causes and effects. This highlights the limit 
of reusability within HiP-HOPS. The effort of reconstructing component annotations for 
every application should not be underestimated (this can easily range into the thousands 
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of expressions), so being able to have more general annotations, thus improving the 
scope of reuse, is very desirable. 
Most of the components in this example system can have their failure behaviour 
described in a general way using statements such as „any output‟ or „all inputs‟. Beyond 
this small example, many electromechanical and complex programmable components 
exhibit similar patterns of behaviour that would be useful to capture. The Time-
Triggered Protocol (TTP) communication controller (Kopetz and Grünsteidl, 1994) for 
instance is designed to always fail silent in response to detectable omission, commission 
and timing failures in received messages, and this behaviour is independent of the 
number, type or relative scheduling of these messages. Fail silent behaviour as in the 
TTP controller is a transformation of one failure type into an omission of output i.e. the 
failure type is not propagated. Generally speaking, the fail silent behaviour can be 
described as the transformation of any input failure class into an omission of output.  
Though it is possible to describe behaviour generally with natural language, the original 
annotation syntax of HiP-HOPS clearly does not have the ability to make such 
generalisations within failure behaviour expressions. In order to capture such patterns of 
behaviour, the syntax must be extended with more abstract terms. The potential to make 
generalisations within component annotations lies in making collective references, such 
as „any‟ or „all‟, to the terms in a given expression. Furthermore, an abstract definition 
of failure behaviour enables a far greater potential for reuse of component annotations, 
for instance in the scalability of expressions; a reference to „all inputs‟ has no 
dependency on the specific number of input ports and thus is unaffected by design 
changes that alter this quantity.  
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3.2 The Generalised Failure Language 
This section proposes the extensions to the HiP-HOPS syntax for component 
annotation, known as the Generalised Failure Language (GFL), which allows the 
creation of Generalised Failure Expressions (GFEs). GFEs make it possible to capture 
patterns of behaviour which can be automatically interpreted within a compositional 
safety analysis process.  
The syntax for the GFL is fully defined in section 3.2.1. Any annotation which employs 
the GFL must contain a component identifier, any inherited values and one or more 
generalised expressions. A generalised expression in this sense does not necessarily 
contain abstract generalised terms, as a classical HiP-HOPS expression may be 
sufficient in some cases. Alternatively it could be a more complex expression 
containing both classical and generalised terms, which is allowable in the syntax. 
3.2.1 Grammar of the GFL 
Below is the complete grammar for the new syntax, giving the rules on how to construct 
valid expressions in GFL format. Detail of the formal semantics of GFL can be found in 
(Wolforth et al., 2010a). 
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ComponentAnnotation = ComponentName [InheritDirective] GFE {GFE} 
ComponentName = "NAME" ComponentID 
InheritDirective = "INHERIT" ComponentID 
ComponentID = Identifier 
GFE  = GOD "=" InputExpression 
GOD = OutputFailureClass "-" OutputPort ["-" OutputParam] 
InputExpression = OrTerm { "OR" OrTerm } 
OrTerm = AndTerm { "AND" AndTerm } 
AndTerm = ["NOT"] (GID | "(" InputExpression ")" | BasicEvent) 
GID = InputFailureClass "-" InputPort ["-" InputParam] 
BasicEvent = Identifier 
OutputFailureClass = "FC" [Exception] | FCList | FailureClass  
InputFailureClass = Operator "(" ( ("FC" [Exception]) | FCList ) ")"  
 |  "SAME(FC)" | FailureClass 
FCList = "FC:" List 
FailureClass = Identifier 
OutputPort = "OP" [Exception] | OutPortList | PortName  
InputPort = Operator "(" (("IP" [Exception]) | InPortList )")"  
 |  PortName 
OutPortList = "OP:" List 
InPortList = "IP:" List 
PortName = Identifier 
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OutputParam = "PM" [Exception] | ParamList | ParamName  
InputParam = Operator "(" ParamList ")"  
 | "SAME(PM)"|ParamName  
ParamList = "PM:" List 
ParamName = Identifier 
Exception = "EXCEPT" List 
List = "{" Identifier { "," Identifier } "}" 
Operator = "ALL" | "ANY" | "MAJ" 
 
Where "Identifier" is a letter or underscore followed by zero or more letters, numbers, 
or underscores, that does not contain a case sensitive match of any of the reserved 
Keywords (NAME, INHERIT, OR, AND, NOT, FC, OP, IP, EXCEPT, 
ALL, ANY, MAJ) or their long versions. Terminals are presented in double quotes 
(""). For convenience or clarification, some terminals can be replaced as follows: 
 
FC  = FAILURE CLASS 
OP  = OUTPUT PORT 
IP  = INPUT PORT 
PM  = PARAMETER 
NOT = ! 
OR  = + 
AND = * 
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3.2.2 Sets of values 
A GFE, like a classical HiP-HOPS expression, consists of an output deviation (the left-
hand side) and its causes (the right-hand side), typically a combination of input 
deviations and/or basic events. Either side may be generalised by making collective 
references to failure class, port and parameter terms; these terms retain their meaning 
from classical HiP-HOPS as explained in section 3.1. Making these terms abstract is the 
core of the generalised syntax. However, an expression does not need to contain solely 
abstract terms in order to be general, or to be compatible with this extended syntax. If 
for example there is only one class of failure a component can experience, then it is 
sufficient to make this reference directly in the expression. 
The first term, the failure class, refers to the type of failure. Within HiP-HOPS, the 
generalisation is made that every component operates on a set of inputs and delivers a 
set of outputs, which means there are a limited number of failure types a component can 
experience. These fall under the category of Provision (e.g. Omission, Commission), 
Timing (e.g. Early, Late) and Value (e.g. High, Low). This work uses these generic 
categories for failure classes for explanation and demonstration; in practice these can be 
more specific if required. In the interests of improving reusability, the use of general 
categories and values should be encouraged where possible. 
Thus the language proposes the use of the abstract term to represent failure classes in an 
expression. This identifier will represent the set of valid failure classes the component 
can experience in any particular application. For example, the output deviation: 
Omission-out-sig 
could become: 
FC-out-sig 
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This abstract reference „FC‟ (for failure classes) will be replaced with a specific value 
when analysed, yielding the necessary application-specific expression; recursive 
instantiation with all set values will create a set of expressions. At this point the 
assumption is made that these values can be retrieved from the model when expressions 
are parsed during the automated analysis. The parser will instantiate expressions using 
all values that a set contains therefore sets do not need any specific ordering. 
Next there is an abstraction made for ports, working on the same basis as for failure 
classes. Input and output ports are represented with „IP‟ and „OP‟ respectively. Finally 
there is the optional parameter, which is made abstract with the „PM‟ term. Below are 
some examples of how these terms would be applied: 
Omission-o1 = Omission-i1 
Omission-o2 = Omission-i1 
Omission-o3 = Omission-i1 
Using sets, these expressions can be generalised as: 
FC-OP = Omission-i1 
where FC:{Omission} and OP:{o1, o2, o3}. 
Alternatively, the syntax allows values contained in a set to be manually specified 
within an expression: 
FC:{Omission}-OP:{o1,o2,o3} = Omission-i1 
The FC set as defined in the above expression contains only a single value. This is 
allowable in the syntax but not necessary as an abstraction; a specific value can be used 
directly as on the right-hand side (‟Omission‟ and „i1‟). Instantiation with all 
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possible values as referenced by each set would yield the original three expressions 
above
3
. 
The benefit of this notation becomes clear when for instance the data bus component as 
in Figure 11 were to be modified to have a hundred inputs and a hundred outputs. With 
the current syntax, it would require a hundred expressions. With the generalised syntax, 
the improved scalability of an abstract reference „OP‟ means only a single expression 
would be needed, with information about ports being automatically parsed from the 
model. 
3.2.2.1 EXCEPT 
By default, every value that a set contains is used to create expressions, but this process 
can be made more flexible by restricting the scope to a limited set of values in certain 
situations. For example, it may be more useful to define those values which do not 
apply, rather than listing all that do apply, so a special modifier is introduced to allow 
exceptions to be made. 
Consider a hypothetical bus component which has two inputs and ten outputs. An 
omission of the first input causes an omission of the first nine outputs, whereas an 
omission of the second input causes an omission only of the tenth output. Even using 
abstract terms, describing this behaviour would need ten separate expressions. Using 
sets with the additional EXCEPT modifier, the behaviour can be described with just two 
expressions: 
Omission-OP EXCEPT:{out10} = Omission-in1 
Omission-out10 = Omission-in2 
                                                     
3
 The process of instantiation is described in detail in section 3.2.5. 
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The set OP still represents all output port values, but the value out10 is excluded 
during instantiation of the first expression.  
3.2.3 Operations on sets 
Combinations of failure causes means that the size (i.e. the length) of expressions can 
grow very large, for example a component may have a hundred inputs, and an output 
failure caused by a combination of failures of all inputs. This aspect can be a hindrance 
to reuse, as longer expressions become more difficult to maintain. The next 
development in the GFL is focused on making generalisations where output deviations 
have more than one cause, for example a combination of causes as in the fuel system‟s 
power bus behaviour: 
Omission-out1 = Omission-in1 AND Omission-in2 AND Omission-in3 
Previously stated was the desire to capture general statements of behaviour with terms 
such as „any output‟ or „all inputs‟, which in the hypothetical case of a component with 
a hundred inputs could be very beneficial. Using sets, it is possible to reduce the number 
of individual expressions needed for specification. By manipulating sets with certain 
operators, the language becomes capable of contracting expressions to reduce their 
length. Contracting expressions is not a generalisation in order improve reusability per 
se, however it does make a useful contribution to the extended syntax by enabling a 
degree of scalability within GFEs and makes larger expressions more manageable.  
The accuracy of analyses is essential, so contraction is only ever performed where the 
logical meaning of an expression would not be altered. Therefore the proposed 
operators perform contraction as a type of „factorisation‟. No essential information is 
removed from the expression; the structure of the expression merely changes to a more 
compact form, while maintaining all values and logical combinations. Contractions are 
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made by grouping together common terms combined under the same logical operation, 
for example: 
Omission-in1 AND Omission-in2 AND Omission-in3 
can be „factorised‟ to create a contracted form: 
Omission-(in1 AND in2 AND in3) 
Further contraction can be made here if a set term is used to represent the list of input 
ports („IP‟) in conjunction with a specification of the common logical operator: 
Omission-AND(IP) 
Clearly, where an output deviation has many combined causes, using operators can 
significantly reduce the size of resulting expressions. 
Applying an operator to a set means they are given the same scalability as abstract sets 
while allowing the capture of general behaviour. There is also the option to apply the 
EXCEPT modifier here to limit the scope of an operator. The use of operators therefore 
conforms to the general format: 
operator(set except:{list}) 
Logical combinations only exist in an expression on the right-hand side. For this reason, 
operators only apply to input deviation terms and are never applied to sets in an output 
deviation. Moreover, any set term used in an input deviation must have an operator 
applied to it, because an abstract set in an input deviation always implies either a logical 
combination of values or a correspondence between input and output values (a special 
case which requires its own operator). When only a single specific value is needed 
however, a set and operator are not required. 
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Keeping to the overall aim of improving and encouraging reuse, keywords are used to 
define operators rather than abstract symbols. With carefully chosen and defined 
operators, the extended syntax is more easily readable and closer to a natural language. 
Many operators could be introduced into this syntax, but for this work the GFL has been 
developed with four operators deemed the most useful for investigation. Two of these 
are operators which generalise Boolean AND and OR logical combinations. Also 
included is an equivalence operator used to define a relation i.e. propagation of values 
across a component‟s input/output. Finally there is the majority voter operator to show 
how more complex logical behaviour, beyond that seen in the previous example system, 
can also be generalised in an expression. 
3.2.3.1 ANY 
An individual pump in the fuel system (Figure 11) continually receives three inputs; 
power, control and fuel and provides a single output, the fuel flow. The pump is 
designed such that an omission of any input or a ‟stuck closed‟ internal failure will 
result in an omission of its output: 
Omission-out = Omission-in OR Omission-control OR 
Omission-power OR stuck_closed 
It is possible to summarise this behaviour as „omission of output is caused by an 
omission of any input or by an internal failure‟. Here there is an abstract logical 
disjunction of input ports, described generally as „any input‟. 
The first operator added to the language is ANY, to represent a logical disjunction of a 
set‟s values. This is equivalent to combining values with OR logic, but this operator is 
applied to „loop‟ through all the possible values to automatically create combinations. 
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So applying the ANY operator to contract the above expression, it can be rewritten in 
the generalised form: 
Omission-out = Omission-ANY(IP) OR stuck_closed 
where the set IP contains the three input ports (in, control, power).  
3.2.3.2 ALL 
Returning to the power bus component as an example, the component experiences an 
omission failure in response to a combination of causes: 
Omission-out1 = Omission-in1 AND Omission-in2 AND Omission-in3 
Looking at this behaviour, it can be said that „omission of output is caused by an 
omission of all inputs‟. Here there is an abstract logical conjunction of input ports, 
described generally as „all inputs‟. 
The next operator in the language is ALL, which represents a logical conjunction of a 
set‟s values. It is equivalent to a series of values combined with AND logic. The power 
bus behaviour can now be rewritten in a generalised form: 
Omission-out1 = Omission-ALL(IP) 
where the set IP contains the three input ports (in1, in2, in3). In this example, if 
additional PSUs were attached to the power bus, the above generalised expression 
would remain valid. In most cases, ALL should not be applied to the FC set, as this may 
cause problems in the analysis to have a deviation which has more than one 
classification. For example, a semantic error can occur if ALL(FC) were used to form a 
conjunction of mutually exclusive failure classes, for instance omission and value; it is 
not possible to have no value and a value out of range on the same port simultaneously. 
Therefore the careful use of this operator is left to the discretion of the analyst. 
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3.2.3.3 SAME 
So far the operators have been introduced to contract the structure of expressions, 
making them more compact and at the same time more reusable. In the examples 
provided above, there is often an equivalence of values on either side of an expression; 
for instance the failure class „Omission‟ is shown propagating from input to output. This 
is not uncommon in typical component behaviour, for example where an omission 
failure propagates through a system. Consider a simple component whose behaviour can 
be expressed as follows: 
Omission-out = Omission-in 
High-out = High-in 
Low-out = Low-in 
This behaviour can be described generally as „any class of output failure is caused by 
the same class of failure at input‟. This type of propagation is captured in the syntax 
with the SAME operator. Unlike the previous operators, SAME reduces the overall 
number of expressions, rather than reducing the size of an individual expression, but is 
still very useful with regards reuse and scalability. Thus with the SAME operator, the 
component‟s behaviour as above can be rewritten: 
FC-out = SAME(FC)-in 
where the set FC contains the three failure classes (omission, high, low). The SAME 
operator describes a correspondence, therefore the set to which it is applied must also 
appear as a term in the output deviation, seen in this example with failure classes (FC). 
It is subject to the same instantiation rules as determined in section 3.2.5, thus with 
instantiation the SAME term is replaced with a specific corresponding value e.g. failure 
class. Only one value is used; the set is not „looped‟ as with other operators. 
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Additionally, SAME can only apply to failure class and parameter sets, as it cannot be 
assumed that there is a correspondence between ports; components do not always have 
the same number of inputs as outputs, nor do they necessarily provide the same 
function. 
3.2.3.4 MAJ 
 
Figure 12 Example voting component 
As a demonstration of more complex behaviour that can also be generalised, Figure 12 
shows an Adjudicator which monitors three separate inputs and delivers an output based 
on a majority combination of input values, i.e. a signal must be present at two or more 
inputs in order to be propagated to the single output. The failure behaviour of the 
Adjudicator can be expressed as follows: 
Omission-out  = Omission-in1 AND Omission-in2 OR 
  Omission-in1 AND Omission-in3 OR 
  Omission-in2 AND Omission-in3 
The behaviour can be described generally as „omission of output is caused by an 
omission of a majority of inputs‟. To represent majority voting behaviour, the MAJ 
operator is introduced. Thus the Adjudicator‟s behaviour can now be expressed as: 
Omission-out = Omission-MAJ(IP) 
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where the set IP contains the three input ports (in1, in2, in3). The MAJ operator is a 
useful example of how more complex operations can be represented in the new 
language, as the original expression to describe the behaviour is considerably longer and 
more complicated than the generalised form. 
3.2.4 Inheritance 
The reuse mechanism developed for use with GFL is called inheritance, influenced by 
the similar concept found in OO programming (Cardelli and Wegner, 1985). Inheritance 
works on the assumption that the analyst will have a source library from which patterns 
can be inherited and reused. The mechanism allows patterns to be reused, either singly 
or extended by a process of specialisation, by using the INHERIT directive in an 
annotation. 
The first type of reuse possible is where an existing set of expressions (a complete 
definition of a component‟s behaviour) is used with no changes to annotate a 
component. For example, the Direct Propagation pattern that defines propagation of 
failures is held in a library. A data bus component expresses this behaviour, and so 
brings this behaviour directly into its annotation: 
Direct Propagation 
FC-OP-PM = SAME(FC)-ANY(IP)-SAME(PM) 
 
Data Bus 
INHERIT Direct Propagation 
The second type of reuse, reuse via specialisation, is a more complex, yet more flexible 
approach. The mechanism is similar to that found in OO inheritance. Specialisation uses 
a stored pattern to annotate a component that expresses an extended version or variation 
of the pre-defined behaviour. This works by taking the original or base behaviour, 
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inheriting it into another component‟s annotation, and then defining any additional 
behaviour to make the new annotation a specialisation of the original behaviour, for 
example: 
Specialised Bus 
INHERIT Direct Propagation 
Value-OP-PM = Value-ANY(IP)-SAME(PM) OR InternalFailure 
Using this type of inheritance creates complications when a specialised component uses 
some, but not all of the base type behaviour. This leads to another feature of the method, 
the ability to override behaviour. Inherited values are the ones which are overridden, i.e. 
they have the lower precedence. Any expressions explicitly defined in the specialised 
pattern will override any conflicting inherited values. It is equivalent to using the 
EXCEPT modifier, though this time it is applied automatically. For example, in the 
Specialised Bus above, the „value‟ class of output deviations are overridden, making the 
pattern equivalent to: 
FC EXCEPT:{Value}-OP-PM = SAME(FC)-ANY(IP)-SAME(PM) 
Value-OP-PM = Value-ANY(IP)-SAME(PM) OR InternalFailure 
3.2.5 Instantiation of GFL expressions 
To accurately describe the way a component can fail, and therefore to provide the 
necessary detail for subsequent analysis, a component is required to have application-
specific information available. In the case of HiP-HOPS, specific information is only 
required for fault tree synthesis, but is not essential at the annotation phase. Therefore, 
generalisation can be employed for component annotations, provided that context-
specific information becomes available at later analysis stages.  
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In order to utilise a GFE, it must be instantiated by replacing abstract terms with 
application-specific values, automatically creating a set of failure expressions for a 
component under analysis. Any individual application-specific values may already be 
listed within a GFE, otherwise the values represented by sets can be automatically 
obtained from the model or defined by the analyst
4
. 
The instantiation of GFEs is automated and, in keeping with existing HiP-HOPS 
convention, works through expression terms from left to right; individual terms and 
operators are instantiated in the order FC then OP/IP then PM. The process begins with 
the output (left-hand) side; in a generalised form, these are known as Generalised 
Output Deviations (GODs). A GOD can represent multiple output deviations. All sets in 
the GOD terms are iterated through, creating a new output deviation for each value 
encountered. Where there are multiple sets, every possible combination of values must 
be instantiated. Consider the following example GOD: 
FC-OP 
given the sets: 
FC:{Omission, Commission} and OP:{out1, out2} 
the GOD will instantiate the following output deviations: 
Omission-out1 
Omission-out2 
Commission-out1 
Commission-out2 
                                                     
4
 In the latter case, templates are used to guide the documentation of such information (section 3.3.1). 
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Thus the GOD and associated set values force the instantiation of four separate 
expressions. Following this, the input (right-hand) side of the generalised expression, 
which is referred to as a Generalised Input Deviation (GID), must then be expanded. 
Whereas the GOD represents and creates multiple instances, the GID expands into a 
single expression, though it is not necessarily identical for each instance (when SAME 
is used). Any set used in a GID must therefore be subject to an operation so that it is 
expanded rather than iterated. As a result their expansion follows the rules as given in 
the previous discussion of the operators i.e. values in the set are combined according to 
the logical rules imposed by the operator. Consider the following example GID: 
Omission-ALL(IP) 
given the set: 
IP:{in1, in2, in3} 
will expand as the following input deviation: 
 Omission-in1 AND Omission-in2 AND Omission-in3 
Any specific (non-generalised) terms are maintained throughout all instances. So a 
complete instantiation would proceed as shown in the following example steps: 
Given the GFE for a bus, propagating omission failures from input to output: 
Omission-OP-PM = Omission-ANY(IP)-SAME(PM) OR bus_failed 
Given the sets: 
OP:{out1, out2}, IP:{in1, in2}, PM:{x, y} 
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Result of GOD parse (set instantiation): 
Omission-out1-x = Omission-ANY(IP)-SAME(PM) OR bus_failed 
Omission-out1-y = Omission-ANY(IP)-SAME(PM) OR bus_failed 
Omission-out2-x = Omission-ANY(IP)-SAME(PM) OR bus_failed 
Omission-out2-y = Omission-ANY(IP)-SAME(PM) OR bus_failed 
Result of subsequent GID parse (operator expansion): 
Omission-out1-x = Omission-in1-x OR Omission-in2-x OR bus_failed 
Omission-out1-y = Omission-in1-y OR Omission-in2-y OR bus_failed 
Omission-out2-x = Omission-in1-x OR Omission-in2-x OR bus_failed 
Omission-out2-y = Omission-in1-y OR Omission-in2-y OR bus_failed 
This instantiation process is automated within the HiP-HOPS implementation
5
, 
essentially making a seamless transition from generalised expression to analysis results. 
3.3 GFL in practice 
GFL increases the potential for reuse, but without a managed approach to performing 
reuse, it does not improve much upon the current HiP-HOPS method. To successfully 
apply the GFL with the aim to reuse, a set of GFEs should be well documented and 
defined as a pattern. Therefore this section develops methods for ensuring appropriate 
capture and reuse of patterns, and also provides some examples of such patterns. 
3.3.1 Templates: Documenting Patterns 
Patterns must be properly documented with information about their purpose and 
application. This will still ultimately rely on the judgement of the user to interpret the 
documentation correctly, but the aim is to provide as much help as possible to ensure 
safe and appropriate reuse. In this respect, the goals are similar to those of software 
                                                     
5
 Implementation details can be found in the next chapter. 
95 
 
engineering design patterns; GFL patterns are described and documented in a consistent 
way via the use of templates. Fulfilling the requirements of the template mean the 
following information is included within a pattern: 
 The name of the pattern 
 A text description of the abstract behaviour the pattern represents 
 Guidance on the implementation/use of the pattern 
 The set of generalised expressions for the behaviour 
 Any inherited or overridden values (if this pattern is a specialisation) 
 Any values for the abstract sets needed to implement the solution/instantiate the 
pattern (e.g. what failure classes apply) 
 Examples of instantiated pattern(s) 
 Cross references to related patterns, or patterns that could be used in conjunction 
with the described pattern 
The name of the pattern should clearly and succinctly identify what the pattern 
represents, as it is the first step to selecting a pattern. Examples would be „Propagator‟ 
or „Majority Voter‟. The name should be kept as concise as possible, as the main detail 
is kept under the next heading, a specific description of the behaviour represented in the 
pattern. This should explain precisely what behaviour is captured by the pattern. In most 
cases however, there is a need to explain in more detail the specific circumstances for 
the pattern, thus included is a section for usage notes. Including these notes should clear 
any ambiguity about the pattern; it should be as long as deemed necessary to fully 
explain the pattern. 
The template should provide all the necessary documentation to guide a pattern‟s 
application. The detail of the template is for defining information used for annotation 
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and parsing by the tool or indeed for the user to study to gain a detailed insight of the 
pattern. This will include the full set of behaviour expressions, most likely in GFL 
format. Where inheritance is used, the declaration of inherited behaviour is given along 
with any overridden expressions. Next, applicable values for sets can be specified if the 
values themselves are general and do not need to be taken from the model (for example 
standard failure classes). Examples of instantiated expressions are given as a reference 
to ensure correctness. Finally, a list of related patterns is included mainly for the analyst 
as a provision to ensure correct pattern selection, as there may be times when a similar 
but more appropriate pattern may be available and should be considered. The following 
pages provide some example patterns in fully-documented form: 
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PATTERN Direct Propagation 
DESCRIPTION Propagates any failure at any input to every output. 
USAGE NOTES Designed for use with normal failure classes such as 
omission, value, commission, etc. and data-based 
input/output parameters. Can work with any number of 
input/output ports. 
FAILURE LOGIC FC-OP-PM = SAME(FC)-ANY(IP)-SAME(PM) 
FAILURE CLASSES Omission, Value, Commission, Timing 
INSTANTIATED 
EXAMPLES 
Omission-out-signal = Omission-in-signal 
Value-out-signal = Value-in-signal 
RELATED PATTERNS Multiplexer, Demultiplexer, Propagator Bus 
Table 4 Direct Propagation pattern 
In the Direct Propagation pattern, any failure of any input parameter will cause the same 
parameter failure at the output. This type of behaviour is found for example in bus 
components and multiplexers/demultiplexers. 
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PATTERN Global failure in the same mode 
DESCRIPTION Omission of every output is caused by a single common 
cause internal basic event. 
USAGE NOTES Designed for data-based input/output parameter. Only 
omission failure classes are compatible. Can work with 
any number of output ports/parameters. 
FAILURE LOGIC Omission-OP-PM = InternalFailure 
FAILURE CLASSES Omission 
INSTANTIATED 
EXAMPLES 
Omission-out-signal = InternalFailure 
Omission-monitor = InternalFailure 
RELATED PATTERNS Multiplexer, Demultiplexer, Propagator Bus 
Table 5 Global Failure pattern 
Global failure is used where an omission of each output parameter at each port is caused 
by a single failure mode of the component, for example an internal malfunction of a 
component resulting in a loss (omission) of all outputs. 
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PATTERN Fail Silent (Transformation of Failure) 
DESCRIPTION Any input failure class is transformed into an omission 
of the output. 
USAGE NOTES Designed for data-based input/output. Only omission 
failure classes are compatible. Can work with any 
number of output ports. 
FAILURE LOGIC Omission-OP = ANY(FC)-ANY(IP)  
FAILURE CLASSES Omission, Value, Commission 
INSTANTIATED 
EXAMPLES 
Omission-out = Value-in1 OR  
    Value-in2 OR  
    Commission-in1 OR 
    Commission-in2 
RELATED PATTERNS Common-cause failure, Bus failure 
Table 6 Fail Silent pattern 
This pattern is for components that can transform detected input failures into another 
type, in effect failing silently. For example, value or timing failures could be 
transformed into omissions. In another scenario, value failures for instance could be 
propagated, as by their nature are difficult to detect, whereas other types such as timing 
or commission failures are detected and transformed into omissions. Parameters are not 
specified as the output is an omission (i.e. there is no signal output). 
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PATTERN Standby Recovery 
DESCRIPTION For a standby component that monitors a primary input 
and activates standby in that case. Both primary and 
standby must fail for the subsystem to fail. 
USAGE NOTES Standby is assumed to be activated upon omission of 
output from the primary. Two inputs assumed, monitor 
(for the primary) and input (for the common input to both 
components), and a single output assumed. 
FAILURE LOGIC FC-output-PM = O-primary-SAME(PM) AND  
      SAME(FC)-standby-SAME(PM) 
FAILURE CLASSES Omission, Value, Commission, Timing 
INSTANTIATED 
EXAMPLES 
Omission-out = Omission-primary AND  
                          Omission-standby 
Commission-out = Omission-primary AND  
                               Commission-standby 
RELATED 
PATTERNS 
Fail Silent, Direct Propagation 
Table 7 Standby Recovery pattern 
The pattern for a Standby Recovery component captures behaviour where a 
combination of an omission of the primary input and any other type of failure at the 
secondary input will result in a failure at the single output of the same type as at the 
secondary input. This can model a component where a primary input is monitored, and 
in the case that an omission is detected, the secondary input takes over. Any failures of 
the secondary input would then be propagated to the output. 
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PATTERN Redundancy on Inputs 
DESCRIPTION All inputs must fail to cause a corresponding failure of 
output. 
USAGE NOTES Can work with any number of input or output 
ports/parameters. 
FAILURE LOGIC FC-OP-PM = SAME(FC)-ALL(IP)-SAME(PM) 
FAILURE CLASSES Omission, Value, Commission, Timing 
INSTANTIATED 
EXAMPLES 
Omission-out-signal = Omission-in1-signal AND 
    Omission-in2-signal 
Commission-out-signal = Commission-in1-signal AND 
        Commission-in2-signal 
RELATED 
PATTERNS 
Direct Propagation, Demultiplexer, Multiplexer 
Table 8 Redundancy on Inputs pattern 
Redundancy on Inputs can be used for components that can tolerate failure of some 
inputs, continuing to operate correctly until all inputs have suffered a failure. 
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PATTERN Majority Voter 
DESCRIPTION All majority of inputs must fail to cause an omission of 
output 
USAGE NOTES Can work with any number of input port/parameters but 
assumes a single output. Possible variation assumes same 
FC instead. 
FAILURE LOGIC Omission-out-PM = ANY(FC)-MAJ(IP)-SAME(PM) 
FAILURE CLASSES Omission, Commission, Value, Timing 
INSTANTIATED 
EXAMPLES 
Omission-out = Omission-in1 AND Omission-in2 OR 
    Omission-in1 AND Omission-in3 OR 
    Omission-in2 AND Omission-in3 
RELATED 
PATTERNS 
Redundancy on Inputs 
Table 9 Majority Voter pattern 
The Majority Voter is another type of „redundancy‟ pattern; here an omission of output 
(i.e. fails silent) is caused by a common failure occurring across a majority of input 
ports. 
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PATTERN Specialised Bus 
DESCRIPTION Propagates any failure at any input to every output; 
value failures also can be caused by an internal 
failure. 
USAGE NOTES Designed for use with normal failure classes such as 
omission, value, commission, etc. and data-based 
input/output parameters. Can work with any number 
of input/output ports. 
INHERITS Direct Propagation 
FC-OP-PM = SAME(FC)-ANY(IP)-SAME(PM) 
FAILURE LOGIC Value-OP-PM = Value-ANY(IP)-SAME(PM) OR 
      InternalFailure 
FAILURE CLASSES Omission, Value, Commission, Timing 
INSTANTIATED 
EXAMPLES 
Omission-out-signal = Omission-in-signal 
Value-out-signal = Value-in-signal OR 
          InternalFailure 
RELATED PATTERNS Multiplexer, Demultiplexer, Propagator Bus 
Table 10 Specialised Bus pattern 
The Specialised Bus pattern above is provided as an example of how inheritance (reuse 
via specialisation) works within a template. Here, the component would exhibit the 
behaviour of the Direct Propagation, but with the addition of a further cause for value 
failures at output. In practice the expressions from inherited patterns do not need to be 
shown, it is included here for clarity. 
 
104 
 
As a minimum, patterns of behaviour should be identified, specified according to the 
given template, and stored appropriately during the course of designing a system. A 
large store of patterns would eventually be available not just for the system under 
development, but for the design and analysis of other systems. However, developing 
methods for managing a library of patterns is not part of this work
6
. 
3.3.2 Steps for defining behaviour 
A difficulty that remains is the problem of choosing the correct pattern to apply in a 
given scenario. The most important point is that the incorrect pattern selection can lead 
to incorrect or incomplete analyses. Therefore it is essential now that a structured 
methodology is defined to guide the decision making process, so that the application 
and reuse of patterns is correct and consistent. This work hopes to encourage the analyst 
to study available patterns carefully, to minimise the chance of error. The process of 
choosing a pattern can be guided with the following general steps: 
1. Determine the component‟s failure behaviour 
The first and most important step is to make sure that it is known what behaviour the 
component is expressing. Following that, it is possible to make a decision about how 
this can be represented generally. To do this, consider the effects on all inputs and 
outputs of the component in conditions of failure. In particular, focus on those 
deviations of output which are caused by deviations of input, either directly or by some 
combination. Also consider any internal events generated by the component which 
affect output. Thinking about and defining the behaviour at the highest level of 
abstraction should make it easier to search for and relate to the exact or most 
appropriate pattern. 
                                                     
6
 This is discussed in section 5.2 Further Work. 
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2. Read the pattern‟s description 
The available pattern library must be consulted for appropriate candidate patterns. A 
pattern‟s documentation must then be consulted to ensure the correctness of the choice. 
Important here is that the behavioural features determined in step 1 must be contained 
within the detail of the given pattern description. If the documentation suggests 
otherwise, other patterns should be considered until the most appropriate is found. If 
there is no suitable pattern available, the situation would imply that a new pattern 
should be created to capture this component‟s behaviour. The remaining steps should 
still be taken before creating a new pattern, as it may be possible to combine existing 
patterns to reach the desired description. Even if creating a new pattern, the remaining 
steps are still valid, but with a change of purpose (creating rather than choosing a 
pattern). 
3. Look at related patterns  
Included in the documentation of every pattern is a list of related patterns; other 
behavioural types similar or within the same class as the chosen pattern. The purpose of 
this list is to direct the search towards the right pattern in cases where the chosen pattern 
may not be entirely suitable. The descriptions of related patterns should always be read 
before the selection is finalised, as it is important to use the most suitable pattern 
available. 
4. Choose the most abstract pattern 
Some patterns may contain expressions which appear to be very abstract and be difficult 
to interpret. In some cases there may be a pattern which contains a less abstract 
definition, one which is simpler for the analyst to understand by reading the expression, 
which will fit the requirements. Where possible, the most abstract pattern should be 
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chosen that can still represent the necessary behaviour. The reason is that once 
annotated, it will allow a greater scope for reuse of the component under analysis. For 
example if a component is likely to undergo a change where the number of inputs is 
altered, a good choice of pattern would be one that includes expressions with an abstract 
term for input ports. 
5. Make sure all behaviour has a definition 
The final step is to check that all behaviour identified in step 1 has been successfully 
represented within a pattern. This can be achieved via instantiation of the pattern and 
manual search of expressions generated. Every output deviation as defined in step 1 
must be listed in an expression with its input deviation cause(s). Instantiation can be 
done manually, however tool support can be employed for automation
7
.  
With a strong library of patterns, these steps to selecting a pattern should be sufficient. 
However it is possible that even if all of the previous steps to selecting a suitable pattern 
have been followed, there may still be situations where no appropriate pattern can be 
found. There are two likely scenarios: 
1) A pattern close to what is required, but lacking all the necessary detail 
2) No suitable pattern found 
In both scenarios, a possible cause is that the required behaviour is available across 
multiple patterns, but not within the same pattern. The simplest solution in this case is to 
search for all the individual patterns (starting again at step 1) and then to employ 
inheritance to capture all the required behaviour into a new pattern. This is the preferred 
option, but it is also possible to use overriding behaviours if an expression is not 
specific enough. Use of this approach should be limited, because if many overriding 
                                                     
7
 Automated instantiation is used in validation of the GFE concept (section 4.3). 
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expressions are needed, a likely better solution would be the creation of a new pattern 
that specifically includes all of the necessary behaviour. 
Even with inheritance, there are still situations where available patterns lack the 
required detail. The alternative solution is to create a new pattern by manually adding 
the extra behaviour to an expression. For example, given the base behaviour: 
Omission-out = Omission-in 
An extended version can be created by appending the required behaviour, for example: 
Omission-out = Omission-in OR InternalFailure 
Clearly, this is a case of trivial reuse however it is still more desirable to use this 
approach than to create a new pattern that is not based on an existing pattern of well-
known behaviour. 
This methodology is given only as a guideline and it would be expected in practice 
analysts would develop their own procedures along these lines. As such this guide does 
not aim to define the process, rather it tries to promote a structured method on which to 
base the selection of patterns.  
3.3.3 GFL applied to the fuel system case study 
Using the extended HiP-HOPS syntax, the previous fuel system case study is now 
revisited to demonstrate how the GFL can be applied to annotations. Table 11 has the 
GFL versions of the annotations found in Table 3. A comparison of these tables 
highlights the benefits of GFL annotation over that of classical HiP-HOPS. For example 
the computer can have all its behaviour defined with just two expressions because there 
is no need to create an expression for every output port. Not only does this reduce the 
workload of the analyst, but the increased level of abstraction also means that if the 
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computer were used in another system or design, the set of GFEs would likely need 
little or no alteration in order to be compatible, thus more easily reused. Another 
example is the power bus which previously required three expressions and can now be 
represented by one shorter general expression. The benefits also extend to the scalability 
of GFL expressions, such as the power bus expression being valid for any number of 
input connections, meaning the addition of more PSUs to the system would not result in 
re-annotation. 
PSU 
 
Omission-out = PSU_failed 
 
Power Bus 
 
Omission-OP = Omission-ALL(IP) 
 
Computer 
 
Omission-OP-PM = Omission-power OR computer_failure 
Commission-OP-PM = memory_stuck 
 
Data Bus 
 
Omission-OP-PM = Omission-ANY(IP)-SAME(PM) OR bus_failed 
Commission-OP-PM = Commission-ANY(IP)-SAME(PM) 
 
Logic 
 
Omission-out-PM = Omission-ALL(IP)-SAME(PM) 
Commission-out-PM = Commission-ANY(IP)-SAME(PM) 
 
Valve 
 
Omission-out = Omission-in OR stuck_closed 
Commission-out = Commission-in OR stuck_open 
 
Pump 
 
Omission-out = Omission-ANY(IP:{in, control, power}) OR 
      stuck_closed 
Commission-out = Commission-control OR stuck_open 
 
Table 11 Fuel system GFL annotations 
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3.4 Summary 
The investigation in this chapter has focused on component failure behaviour and how it 
is currently represented within a contemporary safety analysis tool, HiP-HOPS. Many 
components are designed to perform a function irrespective of the system they are used 
in, for example a component may propagate a signal without needing to know what the 
signal means, independently of the application context. Furthermore, there are 
components that exhibit patterns of behaviour which hold in any context. The HiP-
HOPS safety analysis tool is limited with regards to capturing such patterns within its 
component annotation syntax, limiting the reusability of failure behaviour expressions. 
Based on these factors, and to meet the thesis aim of improving the scope of reuse 
within safety analysis, the Generalised Failure Language (GFL) has been developed as 
an extension to the classical HiP-HOPS component annotation syntax. 
Development of the GFL involved breaking down expressions of failure behaviour into 
their constituent terms and replacing these, where possible, with more abstract, general 
terms which could represent a set of values, rather than a single specific value. In 
addition, a series of abstract operators have been added to the syntax which can make 
collective references to sets of values and enable more general statements of failure 
behaviour to be captured, such as „omission of all inputs‟. A small example system was 
used to demonstrate the practical benefits that GFL can bring to an analysis, particularly 
the reduction in the annotation effort and the scalability of generalised expressions. 
The GFL allows the capture of general behaviour and gives scope to reuse, but it is 
acknowledged that without further detail and systematic methods, performing reuse 
appropriately is a challenging task. Addressing this issue, this development has aimed to 
reduce the likelihood of ad hoc, „cut & paste‟ style reuse by ensuring that reuse is not 
seen as a shortcut and instead is treated as a way to safely use existing, proven failure 
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information in compatible situations in other systems. This has led the development of 
the concepts of GFL inheritance and guiding documentation, taking inspiration from 
software engineering and design patterns. A small set of example patterns has been 
provided which show the typical kinds of behaviour found in safety critical systems, 
such as fail-safe redundancy. Inheritance provides the benefit that a component could 
have a very simple annotation, such as „Inherit Bus‟. The danger is if the stored version 
of the Bus pattern is changed or lost, so as part of the implementation, behaviour is 
automatically brought into the local model. This way the annotation can retain its 
simplicity, but the analysis will still benefit from the reuse. 
The final point made was that all the generalisation and guiding documentation 
introduced is made irrelevant if appropriate procedures are not followed for carrying out 
reuse, e.g. the process of selecting a pattern. Addressing this issue, a set of guidelines 
has been provided on how to choose a pattern that is appropriate for a given component, 
but it remains a manual process and its success depends upon the expertise of the 
analyst.  
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4 Application 
This chapter demonstrates the application of the Generalised Failure Language (GFL) as 
proposed in Chapter 3. A working prototype of a GFL-extended HiP-HOPS tool has 
been developed in order to prove the concept. The discussion in this chapter is focused 
on the existing processes of HiP-HOPS which are extended as a result of the GFL 
integration. The new software is demonstrated on a real-world case study of an 
automotive brake-by-wire system and evaluations are made of the effectiveness and 
applicability of the GFL with regards to the original research criteria, based on a series 
of legacy case studies converted into GFL format and compared with classical HiP-
HOPS. 
4.1 Tools and process 
The failure annotation and the model parsing stages of HiP-HOPS are the processes 
which are the focus of the extended GFL method. During the second step, at the point 
which HiP-HOPS performs the fault tree synthesis, the current and GFL techniques 
converge and the remaining analysis process is the same for both methods. 
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4.1.1 Model annotation 
HiP-HOPS supports several commercial modelling tools. In this work, the 
implementation focuses on HiP-HOPS as used with MATLAB/Simulink (Mathworks, 
2009), hence a „model‟ refers to a Simulink model. 
In a typical model, components and subsystems are represented as „blocks‟ in the model 
diagram, so the topology of the system is displayed as a series of interconnected blocks 
(see example in Figure 13). To perform a safety analysis on a model, definitions of 
failure behaviour are first added to blocks manually, requiring the use of an external 
interface tool which runs in conjunction with MATLAB/Simulink. HiP-HOPS provides 
such an interface so that blocks can be selected from within the model and annotated 
with expressions of local failure behaviour
8
, as well as other statistical data for further 
probabilistic analyses. A prototype interface has been developed (shown in Figure 14) 
to support annotations using the existing or new generalised syntax, or any combination 
of these within a model. 
 
                                                     
8
 The reader is referred to section 2.2.5 and section 3.1 for more discussion of HiP-HOPS and the 
construction of failure behaviour expressions. 
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Figure 13 Example MATLAB/Simulink model view of a hypothetical fuel system 
 
 
Figure 14 Prototype GFL annotation interface 
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4.1.2 Model parsing 
The automated stage of an analysis under HiP-HOPS begins with the model being 
parsed. Part of this process is to check that failure behaviour has been described 
correctly according to the grammar of HiP-HOPS expressions. Assuming that 
components have been given appropriate annotations in the model, the information 
about failures in conjunction with the system topology is used to automatically 
construct the set of fault trees and FMEAs for the system.  
Extending the classical HiP-HOPS annotation syntax with GFL notation requires a 
modified parsing process. This must be capable of successfully interpreting abstract 
terms and instantiating „concrete‟ expressions, given any necessary application-specific 
values. This section demonstrates with a running example how GFEs can be 
automatically interpreted and where this fits in the overall analysis process. Consider 
the structure of the following GFE: 
FC-OP EXCEPT:{out2}-PM = ANY(FC)-ALL(IP)-SAME(PM) 
where  FC:{Omission, Commission}, OP:{out1, out2}, 
IP:{in1, in2, in3}, PM:{x, y} 
Additional processing of the extended parser amounts to sets being instantiated and 
operators being expanded. These processes follow the production rules as described by 
the GFL grammar so that the correct „concrete‟ expressions are always obtained from a 
given pattern. To integrate the GFL successfully with HiP-HOPS, any GFEs are parsed 
and transformed into classical HiP-HOPS expression format, which are then used as 
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input to HiP-HOPS‟s fault tree synthesiser for the remaining analysis steps9. It is during 
this phase that HiP-HOPS can automatically retrieve necessary application-specific 
information from the model (i.e. references to failure classes, ports and parameters) and 
substitute them for abstract terms where necessary. This way the GFL concept can be 
based upon the established HiP-HOPS fault tree synthesis method, allowing comparison 
and validation of fault trees generated from GFEs against those generated from legacy 
annotations. 
To parse a GFE, each side of the expression (output deviation (OD) and input deviation 
(ID)) must first be considered separately. The first step is to instantiate every possible 
OD from any abstract sets in the OD terms. This proceeds in the order FC > OP > PM; 
terms in an OD are parsed left-to-right. Each set is iterated through and every 
combination of values instantiates an OD. For example, the GFE above with the given 
values contained in each set would initially be instantiated into four ODs, each sharing 
the initial generalised ID: 
Omission-out1-x = ANY(FC)-ALL(IP)-SAME(PM) 
Omission-out1-y = ANY(FC)-ALL(IP)-SAME(PM) 
Commission-out1-x = ANY(FC)-ALL(IP)-SAME(PM) 
Commission-out1-y = ANY(FC)-ALL(IP)-SAME(PM) 
At this stage, if an INHERIT directive is specified in the pattern, any necessary 
behaviour is brought into the annotation from the library of available patterns. Also, if 
inheritance-overriding or EXCEPT on an output deviation term are used, this is the 
earliest opportunity for any of these „exclusions‟ can be carried out as required by the 
                                                     
9
 This approach was used to create the prototype of the extended HiP-HOPS tool presented in this thesis. 
Further development may render this step unnecessary. 
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pattern. For example, overriding a behaviour implies that an expression is made 
redundant and can be eliminated at this stage, similarly EXCEPT will reduce the 
amount of individual values to be processed; thus making the „exclusions‟ at an early 
stage can reduce the overall workload of the parser. In the above expressions, the term 
out2 has already been subject to an EXCEPT operation and has no further 
consideration in the remaining parse. Once the OD parse is complete, the set of 
expressions obtained will be the total number of expressions that can be produced by 
the GFE, as no more expressions can be added during the ID parse.  
The next step therefore is the expansion of the remaining generalised ID terms for each 
expression in the set. The first expansion necessary is to replace any instances of SAME 
with the appropriate value taken from the instantiated OD side. This is done first in 
order to improve efficiency, as expansion of other operators increases the number of 
instances which would need replacing later (as can be inferred from later steps in this 
example). Thus, continuing with the above example, expanding the SAME terms gives: 
Omission-out1-x = ANY(FC)-ALL(IP)-x 
Omission-out1-y = ANY(FC)-ALL(IP)-y 
Commission-out1-x = ANY(FC)-ALL(IP)-x 
Commission-out1-y = ANY(FC)-ALL(IP)-y 
The second step of ID expansion is to process any remaining operators, ANY, ALL and 
MAJ; again any set values excluded with EXCEPT are ignored from the parse. It is 
important to note that these operators do not decide the precedence in which terms in an 
ID are parsed, indeed parsing of IDs uses the same ordering as for ODs, i.e. FC > IP > 
PM. However, the resulting expanded expression must still obey standard Boolean 
precedence rules otherwise an expanded GFE can take a different meaning to its 
intended behaviour representation. For instance it is essential that within an expression, 
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precedence is given to conjunction (AND) over disjunction (OR) for any fault trees to 
have the correct structure i.e. the combination A AND B OR C should be interpreted as 
(A AND B) OR C, not as A AND (B OR C), as these expressions represent two 
different logical behaviours. Thus, continuing with the example, the next expansion is 
of the ANY(FC) term: 
Omission-out1-x = Omission-ALL(IP)-x OR Commission-ALL(IP)-x 
Omission-out1-y = Omission-ALL(IP)-y OR Commission-ALL(IP)-y 
Commission-out1-x = Omission-ALL(IP)-x OR Commission-ALL(IP)-x 
Commission-out1-y = Omission-ALL(IP)-y OR Commission-ALL(IP)-y 
Following this, ALL(IP) is expanded to give: 
Omission-out1-x = Omission-in1-x AND Omission-in2-x AND 
Omission-in3-x OR Commission-in1-x AND 
Commission-in2-x AND Commission-in3-x 
Omission-out1-y = Omission-in1-y AND Omission-in2-y AND 
Omission-in3-y OR Commission-in1-y AND 
Commission-in2-y AND Commission-in3-y 
Commission-out1-x = Omission-in1-x AND Omission-in2-x AND 
Omission-in3-x OR Commission-in1-x AND 
Commission-in2-x AND Commission-in3-x 
Commission-out1-y = Omission-in1-y AND Omission-in2-y AND 
Omission-in3-y OR Commission-in1-y AND 
Commission-in2-y AND Commission-in3-y 
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Once every abstract term in every expression has been instantiated and expanded, the 
full set of expressions is passed back to the fault tree synthesiser and the final 
processing continues as per the classical HiP-HOPS process. 
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4.2 Case study: brake-by-wire system 
The brake-by-wire (BBW) system is a design for applications in the automotive 
industry, developed by Daimler Research as part of the Time-Triggered Architectures 
(TTA) (Heiner and Thurner, 1998) project
10
. Figure 15 gives the general design of the 
system. The intended purpose of this architecture is to replace the traditionally hydraulic 
control of a vehicle‟s braking system with a more sophisticated electronic control, 
leading towards more advanced operation and hence improved safety features. This case 
study examines a simplified version of this system as a practical application of the GFL-
extended HiP-HOPS. 
 
Figure 15 The brake-by-wire system architecture (Papadopoulos et al., 2001) 
                                                     
10
 European Commission funded ESPRIT project 23396 (Papadopoulos et al., 2001). 
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The brake-by-wire system is constructed as a network of programmable nodes that 
communicate a braking signal. The brake pedal is continuously monitored for the signal 
to be initiated. When the brake pedal is depressed, the pedal node receives and 
broadcasts the braking signal over the network on two replicated buses (a fail-safe 
measure). The wheel nodes receive the signal and in response, activate the braking 
actuators. 
The provision of an electronic control enables further information such as the load on 
the wheel, the rotational acceleration and other sensory feedback to also be considered 
by the wheel node. Thus the aim of the system is to provide a more accurate and 
appropriate measure of the braking pressure required in the current state of the vehicle. 
Overall, more sophisticated management of the braking functions is provided, such as 
braking proportional to each wheel‟s load, in addition to anti-lock braking and 
electronic stability control. The Simulink model of the brake-by-wire system used in 
this study can be seen in Figure 16. 
All communications in the node network are done over the time-triggered 
communications protocol, TTP/C (Kopetz et al., 1989). The TTP/C controller 
component handles the communication of signals and is designed for fault-tolerance in 
the event of a failure. For example, in a time-triggered network where signals must be 
delivered to a predefined schedule, transforming the hazardous failure types such as 
timing failures into omission failures means the component will fail-silent. An abstract 
diagram of the TTP/C failure behaviour can be seen in Figure 17, which shows how the 
different failure types are handled and propagated by the controller network. 
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Figure 16 Simulink model of the brake-by-wire system 
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Figure 17 TTP/C failure behaviour (Kopetz and Grünsteidl, 1994) 
4.2.1 Analysis of the brake-by-wire system 
The safety assessment begins with a detailed investigation of each component‟s failure 
behaviour. The required information for the tool comes from an examination of 
deviations across component interconnections, as per the standard HiP-HOPS process. 
Where possible, behaviour is described using generalised terms to create the set of 
GFEs for each component, which are then be annotated to the blocks in the model. The 
expressions for each component are given in Table 12, however in the course of this 
case study the expressions have been simplified by assuming there is only one 
parameter associated with each port, the braking signal, and therefore abstract 
references to parameter terms are not included. 
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  Pedal 
Omission-out = PedalFailed 
ValHigh-out = PedalBiasedHigh 
ValLow-out = PedalBiasedLow 
TTP/C Controller 
Omission-out = ANY(FC EXCEPT:{ValHigh, ValLow})-in OR 
      ControllerFailed 
FC:{ValHigh, ValLow}-out = SAME(FC)-in 
Bus 
FC EXCEPT:{Val_Detectable, Omission}-OP = SAME(FC)-in 
Omission-OP = Omission-in OR BusFailed 
Val_Detectable-OP = EMI 
Wheel 
FC EXCEPT:{Omission}-out = SAME(FC)-ANY(IP) 
Omission-out = Omission-ALL(IP) OR BrakeFailed 
Car Braking 
NoBrake1-out = Omission-ANY(IP) 
NoBrake3-out = Omission-MAJ(IP) 
NoBrake4-out = Omission-ALL(IP) 
NoBrakeFront-out = Omission-FrontLeft AND Omission-FrontRight 
NoBrakeRear-out = Omission-RearLeft AND Omission-RearRight 
NoBrakeDiag-out = (Omission-FrontRight AND Omission-RearLeft) OR 
     (Omission-FrontLeft AND Omission-RearRight) 
ValHigh4-out = ValHigh-ALL(IP) 
ValLow4-out = ValLow-ALL(IP) 
Table 12 Brake-by-wire component annotations 
The simplest component in the system is the brake pedal which has only three possible 
output deviations: an omission of output caused by an internal failure of the pedal, or a 
value deviation (high or low) caused by a corresponding bias in the pedal. Commission 
failures (undesired braking signals), for the purpose of this case study, are equivalent to 
value deviations where a value of zero was expected (i.e. the value is nonzero). This 
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behaviour is relatively simple and does not contain any terms that can be generalised, so 
is expressed using the classic syntax. 
A virtual component „Car Braking‟ is used in the model to represent the braking 
function of the car as connected to all four wheel brakes. Output failures of the car 
braking are thus system-level brake failures the car can experience, such as single or 
multiple wheel brake failures. The only value failures affecting the system are those 
which encompass all four wheels, because it is not possible in this model for an 
individual wheel to experience a value failure. Brake pedal bias causes the high or low 
value failures in each wheel and so acts as a single common cause for each type of value 
failure. The complex failure modes of this component can be concisely represented with 
a set of GFEs, using the available operators to significantly reduce the length of the 
expressions. 
As can be seen in the Figure 16 model, the remaining components in this system are 
replicated to some degree; the Wheel nodes, TTP communications and Buses. This 
replication in the design represents literal component reuse within the same context, 
meaning identical architecture providing the same functions and, importantly for the 
analysis, exhibiting the same behaviour in conditions of failure with each instance of the 
component. Establishing patterns for these components can therefore make the 
annotation phase more efficient as there is no need to fully re-annotate for each 
instance.   
Signals from the Pedal are communicated to the braking subsystem via two busses, 
replicated for fail-safe redundancy. Each Bus propagates any failure received at its input 
to all of its outputs. Omission-type failures can also be caused by an internal failure of 
the Bus, whereas detectable value failures can only be generated if the Bus is subject to 
electromagnetic interference (EMI). Each Bus can therefore use the same set of GFEs, 
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which closely follows the Direct Propagation pattern, albeit with some modification, 
having two failure classes (detectable value and omission) listed as exceptions. 
The TTP/C controllers can act as a sender or receiver of signals; in both cases they 
propagate value failures while transforming any other class of failure into omissions of 
output. This type of transformation represents the fail-silent property of the TTP/C 
design, however the component will also omit output if it suffers an internal failure. 
Importantly the TTP/C controller is designed to express its fail-silent behaviour in any 
application, and can have the same set of GFEs for both sender and receiver functions. 
In this case a variation of the Fail Silent pattern can be extended to capture this general 
behaviour by including the „ControllerFailed‟ internal event to the causes of an 
omission failure. The detectable value failure must also be included as a separate 
definition, because this class of failure is propagated rather than transformed.  
The wheel brakes will fail to deliver the braking pressure to the wheel, an omission of 
braking, if the braking signal is omitted at all its inputs (i.e. both TTP/C receivers omit 
output), or if the brake suffers an internal failure. Insufficient or excess braking pressure 
will be applied if there is a value failure at any input. The wheel brakes therefore exhibit 
a variation of the Redundancy on Inputs pattern, whereby an omission of output is 
caused by an omission of all inputs, in this case with the additional cause of 
„BrakeFailed‟. 
The details of each possible braking failure the system can experience are given in 
Table 13, along with severity levels described with the standard severity classes of (IEC 
61508, 1997); catastrophic, critical, marginal and insignificant.  
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Failure Effect Severity Notes 
NoBrake1 Loss of braking in single 
wheel 
Critical Marginal unless car is 
braking while on a 
curved trajectory, in 
which case it may drift 
off course 
NoBrake3 Loss of braking in three 
wheels 
Catastrophic 80% loss of braking 
function 
NoBrake4 Loss of braking in all 
wheels 
Catastrophic 100% loss of braking 
function 
NoBrakeFront Loss of braking in front 
wheels 
Catastrophic 65% loss of braking 
function, 30% loss of 
car stability 
NoBrakeRear Loss of braking in rear 
wheels 
Critical 35% loss of braking 
function, 30% loss of 
car stability 
NoBrakeDiag Loss of braking in 
diagonally opposite 
wheels 
Critical 50% loss of braking, 
15% loss of stability, 
15% loss of steering 
ValHigh4 Excess braking in all 
wheels 
Critical Excess braking can lead 
to loss of steerability if 
wheels lock, but 
stability is mostly 
maintained 
ValLow4 Insufficient braking in 
all wheels 
Catastrophic Major loss of braking 
function 
Table 13 Effects of failure on the BBW system (Papadopoulos and McDermid, 1999) 
The GFL-extended version of HiP-HOPS successfully analysed the BBW model and 
produced a set of fault trees. A summary of the full analysis results is given in Table 14; 
this is a simplified FMEA table showing only single points of failure, as there are 
numerous effects of combinations of failures that HiP-HOPS produces, and for clarity 
have been omitted. 
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Component Failure Effect Severity 
Pedal BiasedHigh 
BiasedLow 
PedalFailed 
NoBrake1 
NoBrake3 
NoBrake4 
NoBrakeFront 
NoBrakeRear 
NoBrakeDiag 
ValHigh4 
ValLow4 
Critical 
Catastrophic 
Catastrophic 
Catastrophic 
Critical 
Critical 
Critical 
Catastrophic 
TTP/C Sender ControllerFailed NoBrake1 
NoBrake3 
NoBrake4 
NoBrakeFront 
NoBrakeRear 
NoBrakeDiag 
Critical 
Catastrophic 
Catastrophic 
Catastrophic 
Critical 
Critical 
Wheel_FrontLeft BrakeFailed NoBrake1 Critical 
Wheel_FrontRight BrakeFailed NoBrake1 Critical 
Wheel_RearLeft BrakeFailed NoBrake1 Critical 
Wheel_RearRight BrakeFailed NoBrake1 Critical 
Table 14 Simplified FMEA showing only single points of failure in the model 
The analysis results show that the duplication of the buses and TTP/C receivers has 
ensured that these components cannot be a single point of failure, hence they do not 
appear in this simplified FMEA. A brake failure can only derive from these components 
if both buses, both receivers at the wheel or one bus and one receiver fail in 
combination at any given wheel. It can also be seen that there is no protection from 
value/commission failures and that the TTP/C sender is a single point of failure. The 
sender could be replicated to solve the latter problem, allowing some provision of 
backup redundancy in the event one sender fails. Solving the value/commission 
128 
 
problem requires a different strategy. Incorrect or undesired braking pressure to some 
but not all wheels is a more severe failure than the same failure occurring in all wheels, 
as it can lead to a greater loss of car stability. For example the car could veer off course 
if braking is applied unevenly to the wheels. Though it is theoretically unnecessary to 
protect against such value/commission failures, as they are propagated from the pedal to 
all wheels, the nature of such electronic controls means it is still possible to experience 
individual wheel brake failures (unlike for instance a hydraulic system). Thus the design 
could still make use of improved detection, for example allowing the wheel to make use 
of replicated inputs and filtering out value errors via a majority voting procedure. 
The design of the BBW system has several elements which are reused, most 
prominently being the replicated wheel nodes and TTP controllers for the signal 
communications. The wheel nodes for example are literally reused components and 
have identical failure behaviour within this application. It is feasible then to define 
GFEs and create a pattern for a wheel so that all instances can use the established 
behaviour, enabling vertical reuse of the wheel pattern.  The BBW model contains 141 
annotated components, which under a classical HiP-HOPS analysis requires a system-
wide total of 1297 failure behaviour expressions. Using the GFL and patterns, the 
number of annotations can be reduced to 714, a 45% reduction in the total. 
The common behaviour for the reused components gives a significant improvement to 
the efficiency of the analysis. For instance the design includes nine TTP controllers, all 
sharing the same failure behaviour (in both sender and receiver modes), that can be 
quickly annotated to the model once defined as a TTP behaviour pattern. If the classical 
HiP-HOPS syntax were used, each TTP controller annotation would require a set of 
three expressions: 
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Omission-out = Omission-in OR Commission-in OR 
     Early-in OR Late-in OR ControllerFailed 
ValHigh-out = ValHigh-in 
ValLow-out = ValLow-in 
When expressed generally and defined as a pattern, each instance of the controller can 
be annotated with „INHERIT TTP Controller‟, a much simpler definition. This type of 
efficiency improvement was also seen with the Wheel nodes and Buses, though there 
were fewer repeated instance. 
In terms of the lifecycle, this approach to annotating identical replicated components 
means that where any changes are made that affect the failure behaviour, the GFEs can 
be quickly updated and the updated expressions will be automatically applied to each 
instance. If used carefully, ensuring that affecting changes are genuinely applicable to 
all instances, this can be a significant efficiency gain for all future analyses of the 
system. 
In the course of the analysis, several components were found to exhibit patterns of 
failure behaviour which were variations on the example patterns given in section 3.3.1. 
Where these components were reused in the model, it was possible to apply the patterns 
and therefore make the annotation process more efficient.   
4.3 Validation: Comparison with HiP-HOPS 
The BBW case study demonstrated some efficiency gains while reducing the overall 
annotation burden, with more concise definitions and reducing the overall number of 
expressions needed. in this section the investigation is expanded by studying a series of 
legacy models that have been used in prior HiP-HOPS analyses to find a quantifiable 
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benefit of potential efficiency gains in other models and analyses. Comparisons are 
made according to the following criteria: 
 Reduction in the number of expressions 
 Reduction of the size/length of expressions 
Exploring the number of replicated (identical) components in a design to compare the 
scope for reusable expressions would not yield particularly meaningful results, because 
classical annotations could be reused in the same manner as GFEs, i.e. there is no 
difference between the two methods in terms of reusability.  
Furthermore, measuring the overall reusability of GFL expressions would involve 
investigating how often a particular GFE could be applied within and/or across models. 
However due to the nature of available models, it was not possible to reliably test this 
factor. Part of the reuse challenge is one of lexical consistency in the way models are 
annotated. For example, the failure class „omission‟ could be described as „omitted‟ or 
„none‟, or other similar names. Models used for this study were taken from a variety of 
sources and do show these kinds of differences. Therefore the algorithms developed to 
find patterns within a model cannot accurately compare patterns across models due to 
these inconsistencies. This type of problem could be solved by demanding consistency 
from the analyst, but it is unenforceable. It would likely be considered restrictive, and it 
could be argued that useful detail may be lost. This is partly the reason that templates 
for GFEs contain a section for typical failure classes that can be used, the aim being to 
encourage the use of the generic types or classes of failures. Indeed, the naming idiom 
that leads to quick annotation will, if used in this manner, intrinsically reuse the same 
failure classifications. 
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4.3.1 Generalisation of expressions in legacy models 
An algorithm has been developed to aid the validation process which can automatically 
make generalisations of a legacy model‟s existing annotations. Using this, it is possible 
to make a determination of how effective GFEs are in reducing annotation effort and 
further to get an indication of how typically patterns of behaviour occur within systems. 
The algorithm can reduce the number of expressions and also the size of expressions, 
though it may be possible that no generalisations can be made within a particular model, 
and thus no reduction be made.  
The algorithm works by identifying those characteristics and structures in expressions 
which can be abstracted and contracted with the GFE terms and operators. The 
algorithm is most effective for components that have multiple expressions to define 
their behaviour. The conversion of classical expressions to GFEs proceeds with the 
following steps: 
 Step 1: Re-order the set of expressions 
The first step can be considered as a preliminary pre-processing of the expression set. 
This is to group together common output terms, for example all expressions referring to 
the same output port would be grouped together, then within those groups, expressions 
would be ordered for failure class types and finally once again for any common 
parameters. The result should be a list of expressions which are in a more suitable order 
for the subsequent steps. 
 Step 2: Reduce the number of expressions 
This step detects where the SAME operator can be applied within an expression, based 
on common values found across a set of expressions. For example the following two 
expressions: 
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Omission-out1-x = Omission-in1-x 
Omission-out1-y = Omission-in1-y 
can be reduced via SAME to become: 
Omission-out1-PM = Omission-in1-SAME(PM) 
The SAME operator can only apply when there is more than one expression for a given 
component; if the annotation has only one expression, this step can be skipped. The aim 
of checking for instances of SAME before the contraction with operators (Step 4) is to 
reduce the overall processing i.e. reducing number of expressions that must be checked 
for contraction. 
 Step 3: Rearrange input deviation terms 
The purpose of this step is to sort and group together common logical combinations i.e. 
conjunctions and disjunctions, where allowable within rules of Boolean logic, so that 
the final contraction step can proceed more quickly while remaining accurate. This 
rearranges the right-hand side of an expression in accordance with the precedence rules, 
for example, the input deviation: 
Omission-in1 AND (Commission-in2 OR Commission-in3) AND Omission-in4 
would be rearranged to give: 
Omission-in1 AND Omission-in4 AND (Commission-in2 OR Commission-in3) 
 Step 4: Contract input deviation terms 
The final step detects where expressions can be contracted with the use of the remaining 
operators, reducing the overall size or length of an expression and making the final 
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generalisations. This initially checks where ANY or ALL could be applied, for example, 
the input deviation: 
Omission-in1 AND Omission-in4 AND (Commission-in2 OR Commission-in3) 
would be contracted to: 
Omission-ALL(IP:{in1,in4}) AND (Commission-ANY(IP:{in2,in3})) 
If an expression has a certain structure, and the required distribution and logical 
combinations of values, it can be possible to make further contraction for the MAJ 
operator. For example the input deviation: 
Omission-ALL(IP:{in1, in2}) OR 
Omission-ALL(IP:{in1, in3}) OR 
Omission-ALL(IP:{in2, in3}) 
can be contracted to: 
Omission-MAJ(IP:{in1, in2, in3}) 
4.3.2 Validation Results 
The validation study of legacy models showed that in terms of reducing the length of 
expressions via GFL, the overall reduction is mostly insignificant. For example, the 
models used in the study had typically fewer than ten expressions that could be subject 
to any significant reduction in length. This is simply due to there being very few 
instances where the operators could be applied. Conversely, there were many instances 
where the overall number of expressions could be reduced. Table 15 lists the results 
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from applying the generalisation algorithm. The example models used in this study were 
provided by Germanischer Lloyd, Daimler AG
11
 and Volvo. They include: 
A)  A ship engine cooling system
12
 
B&C)  Two blow-out prevention systems used in offshore platforms
13
  
D)  A fuelling system
14
  
E) An automotive brake-by-wire system
15
 (as used in prior case study)  
F)  A steer-by-wire system
16
  
 
Model Number of 
annotated 
components 
Total 
expressions 
Average 
number of 
expressions 
per 
component 
Reduction 
in 
expressions 
via 
generalised 
annotation 
New total 
expressions 
Average 
number of 
expressions 
per 
component 
after 
reduction 
Reduction 
Ratio 
A 109 776 7.1 314 462 4.2 41% 
B 20 75 3.7 26 49 2.4 35% 
C 27 100 3.7 33 67 2.5 33% 
D 65 175 2.7 60 115 1.8 34% 
E 141 1297 9.2 583 714 5.1 45% 
F 85 204 2.4 12 192 2.2 6% 
 
Table 15 Validation results 
The abstract nature of the GFL provides the greatest benefit when applied to those 
models that have been fully annotated with expressions that capture the complete range 
of failure behaviour. In such models, the large degree of duplication between multiple 
expressions can be reduced by using a smaller number of more abstract GFEs. Without 
                                                     
11 Formerly DaimlerChrysler 
12
 (Uhlig et al., 2007) 
13
 (Hamann et al., 2008) 
14
 (Papadopoulos and Petersen, 2003)  
15
 (Papadopoulos and McDermid, 1999) 
16
 (Papadopoulos and Grante, 2005) 
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generalisation, the classical HiP-HOPS syntax often leads to a degree of repetition in 
the expressions and terms, and is therefore a good example of a situation where the GFL 
can have a significant benefit. 
The study has shown that most models receive a significant reduction in the number of 
expressions needed. This reduction ratio for most models is in excess of 33%, meaning 
in most cases at least a third of expressions could be removed via the use of GFL 
annotation. A significant result is for the steer-by-wire system (model F), which only 
experienced a 6% reduction of expressions. This is a model which is annotated only for 
early development stage functional analysis, which uses less detailed annotation and 
considers a smaller number of input and output ports, in addition to only annotating for 
omission and commission failures. As such, the components in the model only contain 
on average 2.4 expressions and consequently provide far less scope for reduction via 
generalisation. 
Looking at the brake-by-wire system (model E), there is a 45% reduction, the highest 
level of all the examples in the study. This model contains a relatively high average 
number of expressions per component, which provides the greater scope for reduction. 
It can also be linked to the fact that the expressions mostly share a similar logical 
structure, making it an ideal candidate for GFL annotation. A manual inspection of this 
model revealed that the algorithm had successfully elicited a pattern for a central 
controller bus. This pattern effectively reduced a large number of expressions by 
generalising the behaviour: every omission delay or corruption of input messages 
propagates to the outputs, any bus malfunction causes omission of all messages, EMI 
during communication causes detectable corruption of all messages. Further inspection 
of the remaining models revealed that fail silence and fault tolerance patterns often 
occurred in the failure annotations created by analysts. 
136 
 
The results as shown give an indication of the success of the GFL, however the 
algorithm used to perform the reductions was a developmental prototype and may not 
have detected all possible applications, thus results may be an underestimation of the 
true extent of possible reduction. For example the algorithm does not detect complex 
patterns consisting of more than one GFE, patterns that incorporate EXCEPT clauses or 
any that use inheritance or overridden values. As such it is likely that in practical 
applications the annotation burden would be further reduced. This statement is 
supported by the fact that this validation study has worked only via reverse engineering 
of the models to process those expressions already present; if the GFL were used during 
the creation of the model, it would likely be far easier for the analyst to identify 
applications for patterns. Furthermore, the GFL is designed to operate alongside a 
library of well-known patterns; with access to such a resource, the extent of reuse would 
certainly be improved.  
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4.4 Summary and Discussion 
The introduction of abstract representation within failure behaviour expressions means 
that it must be investigated how such expressions will be interpreted and to determine 
whether or not it is possible to implement this as a useable language. This chapter 
showed that the GFL is implementable, by showing how it can be integrated with an 
existing contemporary safety analysis tool, HiP-HOPS. The details of all the required 
steps have been given, along with guides to an implementation and an algorithm for 
converting legacy expressions into the generalised format. The overall method has been 
subjected to a process of validation via a comparison with classical HiP-HOPS. 
When using the GFL method, the first challenge encountered is the problem of knowing 
whether or not a component‟s behaviour (annotation) can be expressed generally or not, 
or at least to know which expression terms may be represented generally. This would 
very much depend on the analyst‟s skill and experience of the GFL. Having a library of 
patterns available at this stage becomes very useful, though there is still considerable 
effort needed to firstly create such a library and secondly to search it for an appropriate 
pattern. If a well-known behaviour is not found in the library, the time and effort spent 
searching might well be better spent simply annotating the model in the classical syntax. 
This problem however is not quite as severe as it first appears; assuming a correct, full 
set of expressions for a given component, constructed in classical HiP-HOPS syntax, it 
is possible to use the algorithm developed in this chapter to automatically find many 
generalisations and reconstruct the annotation into a generalised format. The new 
generalised expressions can then be documented and stored for potential reuse later. 
Once a pattern has been established, it has been shown to make worthwhile efficiency 
gains for quick annotation when components are replicated within a system, and for 
managing and applying changes made in the course of the lifecycle. 
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Quantifying the benefits of the GFL approach is perhaps the most difficult challenge. 
What was deemed the most feasible approach, used in this chapter, was to examine and 
compare the numbers of annotations needed to fully describe behaviour at both the 
component level and the system as a whole. Doing this gave an indication of how 
effective GFEs are at lessening the annotation burden and also how often GFEs may be 
employed successfully within a model. The results of these studies showed that the total 
number of expressions needed could be reduced by about a third or more compared to 
using the classical annotation syntax, though it varies considerably depending on the 
model and component behaviours. 
Measuring achievable reuse with this method is difficult and has not been ascertainable 
with available models. It is feasible, for example, to evaluate how often a particular 
GFE is employed across various models, but the study in this chapter has been limited 
by the inconsistency in existing legacy model annotations. Any results gained from the 
available models in this way would unlikely be indicative of the true scope and scale of 
achievable reuse. A further significant study would be needed to draw more substantial 
conclusions. 
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5 Conclusion 
In this thesis, the following hypothesis has been tested: 
“More efficient safety analyses can be achieved via a new approach to 
generalising descriptions of failure behaviour. This approach will allow in 
practice the more concise specification and limited reuse of patterns of 
failure behaviour” 
Testing this required meeting several objectives. Those objectives set out in Chapter 1 
are restated below, with a discussion of how each was met. 
1. Examine relevant model-based safety analysis techniques to evaluate the current 
extent of achievable reuse. 
The review of classical and contemporary safety analysis techniques in Chapter 2 
provided the overall direction of this work. The original, classical techniques for safety 
analysis were not designed with today‟s complex systems in mind, and with most 
modern contemporary methods being based on classical techniques, they tend to carry 
over some of their inherent limitations. With regards to reusability, it is a major 
difficulty with most techniques, but this has lead to many advances in contemporary 
methods which reflect compositional system design within analyses. These have had 
some success, whereby analysis elements can be „componentised‟ and reused, but are 
still limited by a number of factors, most prominently the necessity for application-
specific information for each component.  
Thus in order to improve the scope for reuse, expressions of failure behaviour must be 
made more general so that they can have more than one application. This has been 
shown to work in the FPTC method, the argument is that there is scope to go further. 
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Looking at reuse in the wider field of engineering suggested that the overall efficiency 
of safety assessments can be improved in terms of quick annotation for reused 
components with a structured method for documenting and performing reuse.  
2. Develop a concept for generalised annotation and demonstrate that the proposed 
concept works by extending an existing safety analysis method to enable 
specification and reuse of patterns of failure behaviour. 
Over the course of Chapter 3, a new language for describing the way components fail 
has been introduced and developed. The new language was developed as a superset of 
an existing syntax found in the HiP-HOPS safety analysis tool; this was chosen as a 
candidate for extension because of the flexibility and extensibility of the existing 
component annotation syntax.  HiP-HOPS is also an advanced and widely published 
technique that offers a wide range of capabilities, including unique capabilities among 
safety analysis techniques for design optimisation and allocation of safety requirements 
(Papadopoulos et al., 2010). Since HiP-HOPS partly defines the state-of-the-art in this 
area, in this thesis it was considered that useful extensions to the method towards 
greater generalisation and reuse of failure behaviour would generally benefit research 
on contemporary work on compositional safety analysis. 
With the extended annotation syntax, failure behaviour expressions can now take a 
more abstract form, describing behaviour in a more general manner than classical HiP-
HOPS and other model-based safety analysis methods currently provide. The syntax of 
the language is designed so that generalised failure expressions (GFEs) can be 
constructed that remain valid across applications and in subsequent analyses. This 
extension introduces abstract terms and operators, and in combination with additional 
language features, forms the main contribution of this thesis, called the Generalised 
Failure Language (GFL). The implication is that GFEs can be reused along with any 
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component that exhibits a general behaviour in any system, but a larger study of this 
capability is required before more definitive conclusions can be made. The new 
approach also improves upon scalability of expressions, for example abstract references 
can be made to component interconnections (i.e. ports) so that an expression remains 
valid regardless of the amount of input or output connections the component has, or is 
modified to have. As a result, describing general behaviour using the newly developed 
GFL enables the creation of reusable analysis elements, consequently known as 
patterns. 
Examining this new development from a critical perspective, these extensions 
introduced new problems in the application of the tool, as the more abstract notation of 
patterns can be difficult to interpret manually. To mitigate this difficulty, mechanisms to 
perform reuse safely and appropriately, and for constructing and documenting patterns 
were developed in conjunction with the new language. A template for consistent 
documentation of patterns was developed and several examples were given. 
Furthermore an inheritance mechanism was developed and employed to manage the 
reuse of patterns; this feature also allows the creation of new patterns by a process of 
specialisation. 
3. Evaluate the extended method 
To demonstrate the overall concept, Chapter 4 works through an implementation of the 
new language integrated with HiP-HOPS and demonstrates analysis with the completed 
tool by performing a case study analysis, and gives further validation via a series of 
smaller studies. The implementation consisted of a combined parser for the generalised 
language and algorithm to instantiate patterns. The parser checks correctness while the 
instantiation is necessary for application-specific expressions to be automatically 
generated from the abstract pattern.  
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The main case study of the automotive brake-by-wire system demonstrates how GFEs 
can replace standard expressions with more concise annotation and how GFL patterns 
can be found, specified and used as an efficient means to annotate where there are 
replicated components in the design. This has however only been shown to work where 
there is literal component reuse within the same model and not across designs. 
Validation of the method is somewhat problematic; the difficulty in quantifying 
improved reusability has been discussed and resulted in the focus being put on 
validation by comparing the number of annotations required in legacy models compared 
to the amount needed when using patterns. For a practical demonstration of this, a 
legacy-expression converter was also developed to allow a retrospective investigation of 
older models and to evaluate the difference if patterns were applied. Comparing the 
newly implemented technique with the classical HiP-HOPS method was therefore 
limited to evaluating the reduction in annotation effort brought about by generalisation. 
On average, the number of annotations required could be reduced by around a third, but 
this figure varied enormously depending on the system. However, the case studies 
performed were severely limited by the availability of suitable examples. Available 
models were often incomplete and did not contain a full set of component annotations, 
meaning figures obtained for reduction ratios may not reflect accurately on real-world 
performance. Nevertheless, the results from the limited study were encouraging with 
values ranging from less than 10% to over 40% reduction in annotations, and it is 
reasonable to claim that the reduction ratio in more complex, completely annotated 
models could be higher than that seen in the course of the study. 
5.1 Limitations of the concept 
One shortcoming that is expected to create overheads in the application of the concept is 
the lack of pattern libraries that need to be developed to support this method. Clearly, 
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this additional resource of a library of patterns is needed for the method to achieve its 
full potential. More importantly, although in theory the proposed GFL enables greater 
context independence and reuse, ultimately the ability to reuse failure analyses is not 
dependent on the reusability of the linguistic constructs. Rather, it depends on the 
sensitivity of these analyses on the context in which the system is being deployed. This 
context may include different states within the same application or different application 
environments. This is not an issue that has been investigated in this thesis and little 
insight has been thrown to this problem which should be further investigated. 
There are also some issues relating to the process; these focus mainly on performing 
reuse with the GFL method. It has some notable limitations which undermine some of 
the effort made in developing a technique for improving reuse. The inheritance 
mechanism used at present can be cumbersome and is not as flexible as intended. The 
original intention was to enable both „verbatim‟ and „trivial‟ styles of reuse. Verbatim 
reuse, where expressions are not modified, is currently the only type possible, albeit 
with some flexibility with regards to overriding expressions. Trivial reuse of 
expressions, where only a slight change is made to an expression, is not possible with 
the proposed mechanism. For example, the TTP/C controller component examined in 
the case study, though expressing a general fail silent behaviour, could not be annotated 
with the standard Fail Silent pattern, due to the shortcomings of inheritance. The Fail 
Silent pattern can still be used as a guide for manual annotation, though a more capable 
reuse mechanism could allow reuse to take place where extended behaviour is defined 
within an expression; essentially an inline declaration of inherited values. Further study 
would be beneficial to investigate the feasibility of this approach. 
Another problem with the reuse mechanism in general is that allowing expressions to be 
overridden when behaviour is inherited brings about opportunities for new kinds of 
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manual errors. The intention is that expression overriding is used sparingly and 
carefully; a large number of overriding expressions is undesirable, difficult to manage 
and defeats some of the purpose of the inheritance mechanism. The issue is that there is 
no mechanism (e.g. syntax checking) at present to stop the analyst from overriding 
every behaviour from an inherited pattern within a specialisation, undermining the well-
known behaviour. At the same time, the method should remain as flexible as possible, 
and so this is a feature which may need improvement. Ultimately, as with other safety 
analysis methods, a certain level of expertise is assumed on behalf of the analyst to 
ensure the method is used correctly. 
5.2 Further work 
The aim of improving reuse within safety analysis has been achieved to some extent, 
but is far from solved. With regards to the solution presented in this thesis, though some 
improvement to reusability has been made, at the same time it has raised questions 
about the additional effort introduced. One contentious point is whether these extra 
requirements are worth the reduction in annotation effort. The validation study has 
given positive results, but additional research would be very beneficial. 
A definitive answer about the effectiveness of patterns of failure behaviour might only 
be gained through several full-scale analyses performed with the GFL method and 
comparing levels of achievable reuse with an identical analysis using the legacy 
annotation method (though it may be possible even then the result may be system or 
analysis specific, thus the need for several studies). It would be reasonable to expect to 
see in such a study that many common patterns of behaviour would be found, providing 
an opportunity to quantify the extent of reuse. Indeed as more general behaviours are 
discovered and more patterns created (expanding the library of available patterns), the 
method will be increasingly beneficial. Ultimately it was deemed impractical to perform 
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such a large scale study in the course of this thesis, having already gained positive 
results from the smaller case studies. 
If a wider study can confirm the efficacy of the new method, it would be reasonable to 
extend the language further with new operators, enabling the capture of other 
generalisations of potentially more complex behaviour. This was briefly investigated 
with the use of a „majority voting‟ operator to demonstrate this ability, and so could be 
expanded to include other common voting behavioural types, such as minority 
combinations. 
Recent developments in HiP-HOPS for temporal logic suggest that temporal operators 
could also be included in an extended generalised language. Based on work in the 
PANDORA project by Walker (2009), the definitions given to priority-logic could be 
incorporated into the GFL, for instance with operators that generalise the sequencing of 
events, like „before‟ and „after‟. The possibility is that dynamic patterns of behaviour, 
where the sequence of events is critical to the component‟s failure behaviour, could be 
captured, stored and reused. 
Finally, the important issues of dependence of safety analysis on state and application 
context and how it affects the use and reuse of GFL specifications are areas that need to 
be further investigated. 
A small step in extending a state-of-the-art technique for safety analysis towards 
enabling more generalisable and potentially reusable component failure specifications 
has been achieved.  Many more steps are required to realise some of the potential that 
this thesis hopes to have shown. 
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